Grand Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush, and Obama Doctrines by Birkenthal, Sara M
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2013
Grand Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Carter,
Bush, and Obama Doctrines
Sara M. Birkenthal
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Birkenthal, Sara M., "Grand Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush, and Obama Doctrines" (2013). CMC Senior Theses.
Paper 598.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/598
 CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE 
 
 
 
 
 
GRAND STRATEGY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 
THE CARTER, BUSH, AND OBAMA DOCTRINES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO 
 
PROFESSOR JENNIFER TAW 
 
AND 
 
DEAN GREGORY HESS 
 
BY 
 
SARA BIRKENTHAL 
 
 
 
 
FOR 
 
SENIOR THESIS 
 
SPRING 2013 
 
APRIL 29, 2013 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 3 
Table of Contents  
 
Acknowledgements                   4  
 
Abbreviations                      5 
 
Introduction                       6 
 
Methodology                      9 
 
Literature Review                  11 
  Grand Strategy                11 
  Individual Level of Analysis               11 
  Domestic Level of Analysis               13 
  Systemic Level of Analysis                   17 
 
Chapter 1: Carter’s Foreign Policy                           25 
  Characterization of Foreign Policy               25 
  Individual Level of Analysis                28 
  Domestic Level of Analysis                32 
  Systemic Level of Analysis                      35 
  Assessment of Grand Strategy              44 
 
Chapter 2: Bush’s Foreign Policy                    47 
  Characterization of Foreign Policy               47 
  Individual Level of Analysis                49 
  Domestic Level of Analysis                53 
  Systemic Level of Analysis               57 
  Assessment of Grand Strategy               64 
 
Chapter 3: Obama’s Foreign Policy                68 
  Characterization of Foreign Policy              68 
  Individual Level of Analysis                72 
  Domestic Level of Analysis                75 
  Systemic Level of Analysis                79 
  Assessment of Grand Strategy                  88 
 
Conclusion                      91 
 
Bibliography                    99 
 
  
 
 
 
 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 4 
Acknowledgements 
 
 First of all, I would like to thank my reader, Professor Taw, who has been instrumental in 
guiding me through writing this thesis. She took what was a very broad fascination with U.S. 
foreign policy and helped me develop a logically coherent argument. Professor Taw is incredibly 
knowledgeable and the guidance that she has provided me over the course of the past four years 
has been invaluable. I would also like to thank Professor Spalding, who I credit with sparking my 
interest in foreign policy in her course and helping me discover Washington, DC. Thank you also 
to Professor Frangieh and Aleta for encouraging me to study Arabic, allowing me to explore the 
Middle East, and welcoming me into their home. I would like to thank a number of other 
individuals who have shaped my time at Claremont McKenna College, namely Professors Haley, 
Ferguson, Camp, and Espinosa, who have helped me develop as a critical thinker, a writer, an 
advocate, a global citizen, and a person. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends, 
who have encouraged me to follow my passions and curiosities from day one—to Provo, 
Claremont, Amman, Washington, DC, Rabat, and New Delhi. Without their support, I would not 
be the person I am today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 5 
Abbreviations 
 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AUMF  Authorization for Use of Military Force 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
DMU  Decision Making Unit 
EAS  East Asia Summit 
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 
G5  Group of Five 
G7  Group of Seven 
G8  Group of Eight 
G10  Group of Ten 
G20  Group of Twenty 
HEW  Health, Education, and Welfare 
HUD  Housing and Urban Development 
ILO  International Labour Organization 
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NEP  National Energy Plan 
NSA  National Security Advisor 
NSC  National Security Council 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PRC  Policy Review Committee 
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
SCC  Special Coordinating Committee 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WTC  World Trade Center 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 6 
Introduction 
 
 The President of the United States sits at the epicenter of the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment. Widely regarded at home and abroad as the most powerful individual in the 
world, the preeminence of the president in the realm of foreign affairs often goes unquestioned.1 
For the president, foreign policy power derives from Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which 
assigns the general executive power and the roles of commander-in-chief, chief of state, chief 
executive, chief negotiator, and chief diplomat to the president.2 Constitutional factors, as well as 
the unparalleled level of visibility and influence of the president, shape his role in foreign policy 
by empowering him to lead, but they also create challenges to that leadership.3 
 As constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin noted, the Constitution does not provide the final 
word on how the president will interact with other institutions, individuals, and groups in making 
foreign policy.4 It is merely the starting point, an “invitation to struggle.”5 The president is 
certainly not an autonomous decision maker on foreign policy issues.6 Accordingly, in 
attempting to formulate and implement a grand strategy, he faces a number of opportunities and 
constraints at the domestic and systemic levels of analysis. The most notable domestic influences 
on grand strategy include: (1) advice—sometimes competing—from foreign policy advisors; (2) 
Congress; (3) domestic public opinion, media, and the electoral process; and (4) the state of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Eugene R. Wittkopf and Christopher M. Jones, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and 
Process (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 327. 
2  Ibid., 331. 
3  Samuel Berwyn Robison, “The Influence of Presidential Operational Code Beliefs on 
U.S. Foreign Policy Actions in the Middle East” (M.A. Thesis, University of Southern 
Mississippi, 2002); Wittkopf and Jones, 330. 
4  Glenn Hastedt, “Presidents, Advisors, and Future Directions of American Foreign 
Policy,” in U.S. Foreign Policy Today: American Renewal? ed. Steven W. Hook et al. 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012), 17. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Robison, 1. 
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domestic economy. Systemically, the president faces a different set of factors: (1) world events 
and crises; (2) the relative strength of the U.S. military; (3) involvement in multilateral 
organizations; (4) U.S. legitimacy; and (5) the state of the global economy. In theory, the 
influence of these factors, in the form of both opportunities and constraints, remains consistent 
for all presidents. In reality, however, the pressure they exert varies from one presidency to the 
next, as each president inherits a unique set of circumstances, events, and crises that have the 
potential to trigger different factors.  
 The president’s personal foreign policy preferences and goals often take a backseat to 
these domestic and systemic influences. Under the right conditions, however, “if existing 
political constraints and opportunities are well understood by the individual in office, and if these 
factors are in a position to be manipulated, the president is capable of exercising control beyond 
that of any other individual in the world.”7 In this situation, the president may attempt to 
implement his own grand strategy vision, consisting of a clear articulation of national interests 
married to a set of operational plans for advancing them.8 Grand strategies, which are coherent 
arguments about the U.S. role in the world, are often set out in advance, with actions following 
in sequence.9 Other times, strategic narratives are offered as coherent explanations connecting 
past policies with future ones.10 Either way, a well-articulated grand strategy can offer an 
interpretive framework that tells everybody, including foreign policy officials themselves, how 
to understand the administration’s behavior.11  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  Robison, 2. 
8  Daniel W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?” Foreign Affairs (2011): 2. 
9  Ibid.; Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand 
Strategy,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996-1997): 3. 
10  Drezner, 2. 
11  Ibid. 
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 Presidents, in attempting to develop and implement a grand strategy, must first determine 
what they believe to be the most critical issues facing the U.S. and hence its goals.12 Then they 
must formulate a strategic plan of action for achieving, or working towards these goals. If 
successfully implemented, a grand strategy has the potential to drive home a logically coherent 
message about U.S. intentions to national and international audiences, which can be particularly 
beneficial during times of deep uncertainty.13 On the other hand, implementation of a grand 
strategy has the potential to incentivize non-deliberative decision making on the part of the 
president and other foreign policy actors. Whether a president can implement a grand strategy, 
and what the effects are of doing so on U.S. foreign policy, is determined by a number of factor 
at the domestic and systemic levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Wittkopf and Jones, 6. 
13  Drezner, 3. 
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Methodology 
 This paper seeks to determine under what conditions a president can implement a grand 
strategy given the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints, and what 
the implications of doing so are for U.S. foreign policy. It will apply this research question to 
three comparative case studies and seek to determine what domestic and systemic factors are 
necessary for grand strategy implementation. First, James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, 39th President of 
the United States, will be considered as an example of a failed attempt at grand strategy 
implementation. Then, George Walker “W.” Bush, 43rd President of the United States, will be 
considered as an example of a successfully implemented, though unsound grand strategy. 
Finally, the presidency of Barack Hussein Obama II, 44th president of the United States, will be 
considered, using the same methodology. In doing so, this paper seeks to ascertain whether 
Obama succeeded in implementing a grand strategy during the first term of his presidency. For 
each case study, analysis of the president’s personal belief system, quantified via operational 
code analysis, will be presented. Each president’s operational code and personal characteristics 
will be weighed against a set of domestic factors that are key to grand strategy implementation. 
Then, each president’s grand strategy will be considered in light of significant events that tested 
whether it could respond effectively to challenges at the international level. Ultimately, each case 
study will address the question of to what degree, in the face of opportunities and constraints, the 
president managed to put a grand strategy in place, and in doing so, what the implications were 
for U.S. foreign policy.   
 While the analysis in this paper is divided into three distinct levels of analysis, in reality, 
the factors at each level affect each other. As evidenced in the three case studies, decisions, 
characteristics, and personal qualities at the individual level affect factors at the domestic level, 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 10 
as well as views of what is possible at the systemic level and interpretations of systemic level 
opportunities and constraints. Reciprocally, factors at the domestic level affect individual level 
decisions and characteristics as well as relative capabilities at the systemic level. And factors at 
the systemic level affect personal characteristics and decisions as well as domestic conditions. 
The dynamic of complex interdependence that exists among the three levels of analysis 
ultimately affects the outcome of a president’s attempt at grand strategy implementation. 
 Grand strategy’s successful implementation requires a certain set of conditions—good 
leadership, a clear idea, a permissive domestic environment, and “fit” with the international 
challenges of the time. But successful implementation does not necessarily mean that a grand 
strategy is good and, in fact, can create more problems than it fixes. A five-prong test assesses 
domestic factors that are key to grand strategy implementation: (1) a strong, unified team of 
foreign policy advisors; (2) party alignment between the president and Congress; (3) a strong 
presidency; (4) public support; and (5) a strong domestic economy. A two-prong test determines 
whether a president has succeeded in implementing a grand strategy: (1) whether U.S. foreign 
policy during his presidency aligned with his grand strategy; and (2) whether the policies he put 
in place that aligned with his grand strategy resulted in positive outcomes for the global standing 
of the U.S. In subsequent chapters, these tests will be applied to the presidencies of Carter, Bush, 
and Obama to determine under what conditions a president can implement a grand strategy given 
the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints, and what the implications 
of doing so are for U.S. foreign policy. Ultimately, the question of whether a president can 
succeed in implementing a grand strategy that benefits the U.S. will be determined by the 
complex interaction among numerous sources of influence at the individual, domestic, and 
systemic levels of analysis.  
! !
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Literature Review 
Grand Strategy 
 The term grand strategy gained currency in the run-up to World War II, when military 
strategist Basil Liddell Hartand and historian Edward Mead Earle reasoned that “states need 
strategies not just during wars but also in peacetime.”14 They claimed that through having a 
grand strategy, “a state might prevent wars from breaking out and prevail in any that did.” The 
concept of grand strategy was conceived in a world where major threats were identifiable, 
coming primarily from large states able to accumulate industrial power and mobilize vast 
populations.15 Though various scholars and government officials define grand strategy 
differently, at its heart, the concept is straightforward: “Grand strategy is the ‘big idea’ of foreign 
and national security policy—the overarching concept that links ends, ways, and means, the 
organizing principle that allows states to purposively plan and prioritize the use of ‘all 
instruments of national power’—diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military.”16 A grand 
strategy cannot just be a list of foreign policy aspirations or priorities; it must consist of a “clear 
articulation of national interests married to a set of operational plans for advancing them” that is 
conceived of and put in place by a president.17  
Individual Level of Analysis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim, “Grand Flattery: The Yale Grand Strategy 
Seminar,” The Nation, May 28, 2012, accessed December 8, 2012 http://www.thenation 
.com/article/167807/grand-flattery-yale-grand-strategy-seminar#. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Rosa Brooks, “Obama Needs a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2012, 
accessed December 8, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/23/obama_needs 
_a_grand_strategy; Drezner, 2. 
17  Ibid. 
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 Despite the power of domestic and systemic factors over grand strategy implementation, 
the president’s image of the political universe is related to foreign policy outcomes.18 According 
to Alexander George, who was a behavioral scientist and professor of political science at 
Stanford University, “the way in which the leaders of nation-states view each other and the 
nature of world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in 
relations among states.”19 George posits that the influence of U.S. presidential psychological 
characteristics on grand strategy can be assessed via operational code analysis. Originally 
developed by Nathan Leites in a U.S. government study to assess the beliefs of the Soviet 
Politburo, operational code is a “political belief system with some elements—philosophical 
beliefs—guiding the diagnosis of the context for action and others—instrumental beliefs—
prescribing the most effective strategy and tactics for achieving goals.”20  
 Operational code—“the most widely used concept relating to the link between belief 
systems and international relations”—is a replicable system of analysis that looks at both 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs based on the rhetoric of political leaders, assessed through 
verb usage and strength.21 Through this analysis, an individual’s “schemata”—private and 
subjective principles that order one’s relationship with the social environment—can be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  Sam Robinson, “George W. Bush and the Vulcans: Leader-Advisor Relations and 
America’s Response to the 9/11 Attacks,” in Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods 
and Applications of Operational Code Analysis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), vii. 
19  Alexander George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Leaders and Decision Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969): 190. 
20  Robinson, 7; Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “Belief Systems as Casual 
Mechanisms in World Politics: An Overview of Operational Code Analysis,” in Beliefs and 
Leadership in World Politics, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 4. 
21  Wittkopf and Jones, 327; Alexander George, “The Causal Nexus between Cognitive 
Beliefs and Decision Making Behavior: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System,” in 
Psychological Models of International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1979), 98-9; Robison, 7. 
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uncovered.22 Operational code can be assessed based on ten research questions regarding specific 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs.23 By taking an agent-centered approach—centered in this 
case on U.S. presidents as foreign policy actors—one can gain critical insight into how a 
president’s worldview has the potential to influence grand strategy at the individual level of 
analysis. 
Domestic Level of Analysis 
 Each president faces a set of opportunities and constraints at the domestic level. These 
domestic factors can be synthesized into a conceptualization of the foreign policymaking process 
as a series of three concentric circles developed by political scientist Roger Hilsman.24 According 
to Hilsman’s model, the innermost circle contains the U.S. president himself, as well as his 
immediate advisors and political appointees—such as the secretaries of state and defense, the 
director of national intelligence, and various under-and-assistant secretaries who bear 
responsibility for carrying out policy decisions.25 The second circle contains various departments 
and agencies of the executive branch whose primary responsibility is to provide policymakers 
with the necessary information to carry out foreign policy decisions.26 The outermost circle—
what Hilsman calls the “public one”—consists of Congress, interest groups, public opinion, and 
mass media.27 The institutions, groups, and individuals at this level are least involved in the day-
to-day foreign policymaking process, according to Hilsman. This model aligns with the 
previously established five-prong test in that the first prong (foreign policy team) is 
simultaneously contained in the first and second circles, the third prong (strength of presidency) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  George (1979), 96. 
23  Walker and Schafer, 7. 
24  Wittkopf and Jones, 328. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid., 328-30. 
27  Ibid., 330. 
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is contained in the first circle, and the second, fourth, and fifth prongs (Congress, public opinion, 
and domestic economy) are contained in the third circle. The implication of Hilsman’s model is 
that because important decisions are made within the innermost circle, the actors in that circle 
have the greatest potential to facilitate or impede a president’s attempt at grand strategy 
implementation. The influence of various actors in the second and third circles declines with 
their distance from the center.28  
 The presidential advisory system is another domestic variable that has influence over 
grand strategy implementation. The executive departments of government and the political 
appointees who head them are at the heart of the foreign policymaking process, particularly the 
Departments of State and Defense.29 The secretary of state is theoretically the president’s 
foremost foreign policy advisor and the Department of State is charged with overseeing the 
United States’ overseas activities.30 The Department of Defense has gained prominence since 
World War II. The intelligence community—“America’s eyes and ears in a dangerous world”—
is also of particular importance to the foreign policy process.31 Additionally, in recent decades, 
agencies with responsibilities in international economic affairs and homeland security have 
gained a greater voice in affecting foreign policy decisions.32 Together, the secretaries of state 
and defense, the director of national intelligence, and a number of other senior national security 
advisors and cabinet officials make up the president’s National Security Council (NSC)—his 
principal forum for considering national security matters.33 In practice, these senior advisors and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28  Ibid. 
29  Wittkopf and Jones, 367-8. 
30  Ibid., 368. 
31  Ibid., 368, 388. 
32  Ibid., 368. 
33  “National Security Council,” The White House, accessed December 9, 2012, http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc. 
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cabinet-level officials exist concurrently in Hilsman’s first and second circles of influence, as 
they simultaneously advise the president on foreign policy issues and oversee large, complex, 
executive bureaucracies.34 Taken collectively, the president and his foreign policy advisors make 
up a multiperson decision making unit (DMU).35 Which individuals the president selects for 
these positions, as well as how closely and with what order of priority he heeds their advice, has 
the potential to determine both whether he can implement a grand strategy and what that grand 
strategy will look like.  
 Another institution that possesses multiple avenues of influence over foreign policy is 
Congress. Regarding the congressional role in foreign policy, the Constitution creates the 
possibility for interbranch competition by distributing responsibilities across both the executive 
and legislative branches.36 Specifically, the Constitution assigns the president a limited number 
of powerful foreign policy roles, including the general executive power, commander-in-chief 
authority, treaty negotiation (subject to a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate), and diplomatic 
appointments (subject to Senate approval).37 Congress, on the other hand, is assigned more 
numerous and specific foreign policy powers, including legislating, providing funding to pay for 
foreign policy initiatives, setting import duties, regulating foreign commerce, overseeing the 
military, and declaring war.38 The relationship between the legislative and executive branches 
with regard to foreign policy can be characterized as: (1) competitive—in which Congress 
challenges the president for influence; (2) disengaged—in which an acquiescent Congress 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34  Wittkopf and Jones, 368. 
35  Ilan Peleg, The Legacy of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy: Moving Beyond 
Neoconservatism (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 104-6. 
36  Ralph G. Carter and James M. Scott, “Striking a Balance: Congress and U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” in U.S. Foreign Policy: American Renewal? ed. Steven W. Hook et al. (Washington, 
DC: CQ Press, 2012), 37-8. 
37  Ibid., 38. 
38  Ibid. 
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complies with presidential preferences; (3) supportive—in which Congress generally cooperates 
with the president; or (4) strategic—in which Congress selects its battles carefully, but is willing 
to challenge the president.39 Thus, through both legislative means—such as passing laws and 
appropriating funding—and nonlegislative means—such as conducting oversight hearings—
Congress has the potential to affect a president’s attempt at grand strategy implementation. 
Further, the balance of power within Congress can have a significant impact on whether a 
president is able to achieve his grand strategy goals, as hyper-partisanship or a divided Congress 
can prevent the timely passage of legislation. 
 Domestic public opinion and media, often manifest in the electoral process, hold 
considerable sway over U.S. foreign policy. Despite the fact that the American public is 
generally ignorant about most international issues, The Gallup Organization and other 
mainstream media routinely ask Americans what they think about foreign policy.40 U.S. 
presidents and other government officials claim to take citizens’ foreign policy attitudes and 
preferences into account in decision making in an effort to represent and serve the interests of 
their constituents.41 However, considering the disproportionate influence held by lobbying 
groups and the foreign policy elite, the voice of the individual American citizen is not likely to 
have a significant impact on grand strategy formulation and implementation. Taken collectively, 
though “the public has the potential to have an impact on agenda setting, or on decision makers’ 
anticipation of later, retrospective public opinion, or on the rhetorical packaging of policy 
choices.”42 The public can also exercise control over the foreign policy process through 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39  Ibid., 38-9. 
40  Wittkopf and Jones, 250-4. 
41  Ibid., 251. 
42  Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” 
American Political Science Review 99 (2005): 118. 
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participation in the electoral process, as democratic leaders, including the president, are subject 
to being forced out of office via the democratic process.43 Thus, in an effort to stay in office, they 
generally avoid making policy, and ultimately grand strategy decisions that are likely to receive 
highly negative media attention. And if they must make decisions that are widely unpopular 
among the public at large, they face the threat of punishment in the form of being forced out of 
office. 
 The final domestic factor that has a significant impact on whether a president is able to 
put a grand strategy in place is the state of the domestic economy. Considering that the United 
States’ wealth—“the level, sources, and nature of its productive economy”—is among its most 
powerful tools of statecraft, the state of the economy has a considerable bearing on grand 
strategy.44 The economy is an “essential component to almost all political decisions made by the 
president.”45 In fact, it is often the case that if the domestic economy is struggling, presidents 
may be forced to turn their grand strategies inwards and focus first on repairing the U.S. 
economy and then on setting their sights overseas. A booming economy, on the other hand, may 
leave a president free to immediately pursue a grand strategy. Either way, the state of the 
domestic economy, along with a host of other domestic and systemic factors, has the potential to 
impact both the nature of a president’s grand strategy and his ability to implement one at all. 
Systemic Level of Analysis 
 Because of the interconnectedness of the international system, world events and crises 
have the potential to enhance or constrain grand strategy implementation. Without question, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43  Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 55. 
44  Robert J. Art, America’s Grand Strategy and World Politics (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 13. 
45  Robison, 21. 
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nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts, and humanitarian crises are of interest to the U.S.46 
However, the question of which of these concerns pose a serious enough threat to U.S. security 
to warrant intervention is where grand strategy comes into play. For if the U.S. were to intervene 
in too many global systemic crises, it would risk imperial overstretch.47 Regardless, certain 
events demand attention, even if they may not fall within the intentional purview of a president’s 
grand strategy. In fact, an unforeseen event or crisis, or one that invokes U.S. interests or 
escalates unexpectedly, may come to define a president’s grand strategy. Further, the analysis of 
systemic crises and grand strategy necessitates a discussion of a foreign policy choice that a 
president faces, between global hegemonism and cooperative realism.48 Ultimately, it is essential 
that a president's worldview match the needs of the international system and that his grand 
strategy align with global events, although a grand strategy may certainly be shaped by 
unforeseen opportunities at the international level. For if a president’s policy preferences are out 
of line with real world challenges or U.S. needs, then he risks being unable to respond to these 
challenges, or responding in a way that is detrimental to U.S. interests. 
 The relative suitability of the U.S. military is among the most important systemic 
variables that impacts whether a president can successfully implement a grand strategy. Since 
World War II, U.S. foreign policy has become increasingly militarized, as policymakers have 
come to define international political problems in terms of military.49 According to political 
scientist Robert J. Art, “military power remains vital to America’s statecraft, not only to protect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46  Posen and Ross, 23, 29. 
47  Ibid., 32-43. 
48  Barry Naughten, “U.S. Foreign Energy Strategy and Grand Strategy Choice: Global 
Systemic Crises Confronting the Obama Administration,” International Journal of Global 
Energy Issues 33 (2010): 1. 
49  Wittkopf and Jones, 76. 
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the homeland, but to support its broader interests as well.”50 While the U.S. is still home to the 
strongest military in the world, in today’s shifting security landscape, the United States’ military 
capabilities must be adjusted to new challenges, namely transnational terrorism.51 With the 
emergence of “asymmetrical” threats, transnational terrorist organizations and other non-states 
actors can take advantage of attacking the U.S. without having to confront American forces on 
the battlefield.52 This means that to protect U.S. security, a grand strategy must determine which 
of these threats is most significant, taking into account both past patterns of military 
preparedness and interventionist practices as well as evolving counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency techniques. In formulating a grand strategy, a president must inevitably 
balance these strategic interests with consideration of defense budgets under fiscal austerity and 
threats of U.S. declinism. 
 Within the context of the international system, the United States’ involvement in 
multilateral organizations presents its own set of opportunities and constraints on the 
establishment of grand strategy. The U.S. is a member of a vast number of international 
institutions, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), G5, G7, G8, G10, G20, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Whether a president’s grand strategy favors strong support of these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50  Art, 32. 
51  Ibid. 
52  P. Edward Haley, Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 133. 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 20 
organizations, membership in them is a reality of the international system.53 International 
organizations serve as a forum in which the U.S. can both exercise its power—via permanent 
membership on the UNSC, for example—and keep the power of its political and economic 
competitors—such as China and Russia, which are also permanent members—in check. The 
question of how strongly a president relies on multilateralism—“working in concert with others, 
usually on the basis of some principle such as collective security”—and thus participation in 
multilateral organizations, can shape his grand strategy.54 
 Another factor at the systemic level that has an influence on grand strategy is U.S. 
legitimacy, which can be represented by “soft power”—a term coined by Joseph Nye, dean of 
the Kennedy School of Government and former assistant secretary of defense for international 
security affairs.55 At its core, soft power means using “an attraction to shared values and the 
justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values” to engender cooperation. 
By most measures, U.S. soft power—and hence U.S. primacy—remains dominant. It is certainly 
true that “the U.S. can act without the world’s applause.”56 Yet, it is not smart to discount soft 
power as “just a question of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity.”57 In certain 
cases, soft power can help soften the sharp edges of policies and reduce the resentments that they 
engender.58 Soft power and foreign policy are inherently interconnected; just as soft power has 
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some bearing on a president’s ability to win approval for a grand strategy, soft power, itself, can 
be affected by U.S. foreign policy.59 
 The final factor with influence at the systemic level is the state of the international 
economy. The U.S., as part of the global economy, must be concerned with the economic health 
of other nations of the world.60 Americans are “voracious consumers of imported goods” and 
they export more than any other nation on earth.61 Because trade is the major engine of U.S. 
prosperity, the national interests and goals of the U.S. are closely tied to the fortunes of its 
trading partners.62 There is also a link between a the state of the global economy and U.S. 
security, as a “strong world economy enhances U.S. national security by advancing prosperity 
and freedom in the rest of the world.”63 Because of the United States’ dependence on a robust 
global economy, particularly the need for a secure global oil market, the state of the global 
economy has the potential to either advance or hinder a president’s attempt at grand strategy 
implementation. Accordingly, in the “21st century global economy, where business is truly 
multinational and economic uncertainty has a ripple effect that extends across national 
boundaries,” the U.S. cannot allow instability to affect itself or its trading partners.64 Ultimately, 
a president who is faced with a weak global economy will be forced to address it as part of his 
grand strategy or risk U.S. security and vitality. Interestingly, while the military, the economy, 
and U.S. values are systemic variables in that their influence is rooted in their strength relative to 
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other countries, they are also rooted in assets, resources, decisions, and priorities at the domestic 
level.  
 It remains to be seen whether the U.S. will continue to be the world’s “indispensible 
nation.”65 The 2008 global economic crisis, among other factors, suggest that long-standing 
concerns over the United States’ decline may finally be true.66 Whether decline is a function of 
the classic argument of imperial overstretch, of what author and journalist Fareed Zakaria saw as 
“the rise of the rest,” or of American diplomat Haass’s “non-polar system” model, the rise of 
multipolarity in the international system is increasingly a reality.67 Specifically, most analysts 
view China, the most populous of the emerging industrial economies, as the most likely 
competitor of the U.S. in this century—its so-called “peer competitor.”68  
 Nevertheless, despite these potential challenges to its primacy in the international system, 
American exceptionalism—the idea that Americans are a unique and exemplary group of 
people—remains a strong current in U.S. foreign policy.69 “American political leaders continue 
to justify the global engagement of the U.S. on the basis of American exceptionalism: no other 
nation has the capability or is morally qualified to lead.”70 There are three aspects of American 
exceptionalism that are particularly important: (1) America’s image of itself as a uniquely 
democratic nation; (2) its preoccupation with moral and legal justifications for the use of force; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65  Dombrowski, 97. 
66  Ibid., 96. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Wittkopf and Jones, 547. 
69      Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 23. 
70  Haley, 9. 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 23 
and (3) its expectation of success in foreign policy.71 These principles must be assessed alongside 
claims of declinism and considered as a factor in the development and implementation of grand 
strategy. Although the three levels of analysis have been presented as distinct from one another, 
there is a tradition of looking at how they interact, most notably undertaken by Robert D. 
Putnam, Peter Gourevitch, and Helen Milner. Putnam puts forth the theory of the two-level 
game—which recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the national interest 
requires.72 In the same vein, Gourevitch and Milner point to domestic politics as an explanatory 
variable for foreign policy.73  
 Carter, Bush, and Obama each came into office with a worldview and international 
aspirations. Carter and Obama both began their presidency with intentions to implement a grand 
strategy, and Bush began his with a distinctive worldview that later developed into a grand 
strategy as a result of the September 11 attacks. At the individual level, each had a unique 
operational code, management, and communication style that determined how well he could 
articulate his foreign policy vision and oversee its implementation. At the domestic level, each 
faced partisan competition; the relative strengths of Congress, the presidency, and other foreign 
policy institutions; public opinion; and relationships among foreign policy advisors. For each, a 
unique combination of these domestic factors challenged or facilitated his attempt at grand 
strategy implementation. At the systemic level, each faced or initiated significant events that 
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determined whether his grand strategy vision could stand up to international challenges. Whether 
each succeeded in implementing his grand strategy, and what this meant for U.S. foreign policy 
was a result of the interaction among factors at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of 
analysis. 
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Carter’s Foreign Policy (1977-1981) 
 
“I am a farmer, an engineer, a father and a husband, a Christian, a politician and former 
governor, a planner, a businessman, a nuclear physicist, a naval officer, a canoeist and among 
other things, a lover of Bob Dylan’s songs and Dylan Thomas’ poetry.” 
 
      —Jimmy Carter 
 
Characterization of Foreign Policy 
 
 Despite a number of crises that characterized his presidency Jimmy Carter attempted to 
implement a grand strategy—a big idea of how the U.S. should use its instruments of national 
power.74 His grand strategy embraced moralism while rejecting isolationism.75 It was based 
around the premise that a strong human rights policy was a crucial element in an effective war 
strategy, that the struggle with the Soviet Union required a moral dimension.76 Upon taking 
office, he sought to reduce U.S. commitments abroad.77 According to David Skidmore, professor 
of politics and international relations at Drake University, his initial grand strategy sought to: (1) 
restrain overall defense spending and shift priorities from strategic and developing country 
intervention forces to NATO forces; (2) withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea; (3) reduce U.S. 
arm sales and military aid abroad; (4) restrict Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert actions; 
and (5) avoid military entanglements in peripheral regions and concentrate on key areas. He 
hoped to build support for his grand strategy by replacing America’s policy of reactive 
containment with one based on human rights.78 Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he 
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attempted to implement his grand strategy in the form of a worldwide campaign for human 
rights, an initiative steeped in Wilsonian idealism.79  
 In contrast, the Carter Doctrine, put in place after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, did 
not fall in line with this earlier declared policy of restraint.80 With the establishment of the Carter 
Doctrine, Carter’s grand strategy underwent a dramatic shift in response to global realities. His 
revised grand strategy was more pragmatic, but at the end of the day it was still wrapped in 
moral character.81 Even his adjusted strategy placed less emphasis on security than those of his 
predecessors and more on promoting human rights to various actors, including both allies and 
non-allies in the international system. 
 Insight into the outcome of Carter’s attempt at grand strategy implementation can be 
found at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of analysis. At the individual level, 
analysis of Carter’s operational code is critical to understanding his grand strategy, as the former 
fed directly into the latter, coloring its relative strengths and weaknesses. Such an analysis 
indicates that his vision of the political universe was initially one of cooperation and of optimism 
regarding the realization of his goals. During the fourth year of his presidency, however, his view 
of the political universe became more conflictual and his operational code underwent a drastic 
shift in response to international events; his grand strategy adjusted accordingly. He created 
additional challenges at the individual level in the form of his selection and management of 
foreign policy advisors, factors that affected his options for grand strategy implementation at the 
domestic and systemic levels.  
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 At the domestic level, Carter faced a number of factors that served as checks on his 
attempt at grand strategy implementation. Based on the five-prong test for evaluating domestic 
factors, he was confronted with: (1) strained relationships among his foreign policy advisors; (2) 
a non-permissive Congress; (3) diminished presidential power in the aftermath of Vietnam and 
Watergate; (4) poor public opinion; and (5) a flagging domestic economy. These domestic 
factors are connected to those at the individual level of analysis in that they impacted his foreign 
policy decisions. They are also interrelated with those at the systemic level because they 
impacted how effectively he could respond to international events. 
 At the systemic level, Carter faced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the energy crisis, 
and the Iran hostage crisis, a series of events that tested the outcome of his grand strategy. 
Although he shifted his grand strategy in a conflictual direction, domestic factors impeded the 
implementation of both his original grand strategy and his revised one. The swing in his grand 
strategy is evidence in and of itself of the failure of his initial strategy; he would not have felt the 
need to adjust his approach had it been adequate. He also failed to implement his modified grand 
strategy, as he did too little and was too late in recrafting his grand strategy upon realizing that 
his original one was inadequate for dealing with global realities. These systemic factors are 
connected to those at the individual level of analysis in that they caused a shift in his operational 
code. They are also interrelated with those at the domestic level because they exacerbated many 
challenges that he faced domestically. Based on the two prong test for assessing grand strategy 
success, he: (1) failed to implement policies that aligned closely with his grand strategy; and (2) 
when he did implement policies that aligned with his grand strategy, they were often failures. 
Carter had an overall nonpermissive package: his worldview, partnered with domestic constraints 
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impeded his ability to respond effectively to international events. Thus, he failed both in terms of 
grand strategy implementation and success. 
Individual Level of Analysis 
 
 In examining the conditions under which an individual can implement a grand strategy, 
consideration of operational code is of critical importance, as grand strategy and operational code 
overlap significantly.82 In a study of Carter’s operational code, Stephen G. Walker, Mark 
Schafer, and Michael G. Young examined a collection of twenty-two of his speeches that dealt 
with foreign policy issues, specifically U.S.-Soviet relations and human rights.83 In analyzing 
these speeches, it is clear that his vision is one of cooperation among various actors in the 
political universe and of optimism regarding the realization of his political goals.84 Further, 
because he saw the political universe as somewhat unpredictable due to its complex 
interdependence, he attributed a high value to the role of chance despite his relatively strong 
belief in his ability to control historical developments.85 His worldview was characterized by a 
relatively risk averse orientation and a low propensity to shift his strategy and tactics.86 
 Overall, Carter viewed his relationships in the political universe as mutually cooperative, 
though he believed himself to be somewhat more cooperative than others in the political 
universe. As a cooperative moralist, he had a tendency to use positive rather than negative 
sanctions as a means of exercising power. Accordingly, he preferred promises and rewards to 
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punishments and threats in dealing with political actors.87 His religious background, specifically 
his evangelism, was an influential factor in the formation of his operational code.88 His Christian 
upbringing led him toward a belief that humanity is capable of redemption and that all things are 
possible with God.89 From this foundation came a passion for social justice and a moral sense of 
responsibility.90  
 Evidence of Carter’s operational code, particularly his tendency toward cooperation, can 
be found in his willingness to extend respect to even the most objectionable leaders, a tactic that 
drew harsh criticism of him as naïve and ill-equipped to deal with sensitive political 
negotiations.91 Evidence of his optimism about his prospects of realizing his political values can 
be seen in his strong orientation, from childhood, toward self-improvement and goal 
achievement.92 For example, he pursued his goal of entering the U.S. Naval Academy by 
meticulously planning his time and activities to facilitate his success. The assessment that he had 
a fairly strong belief that he could affect historical developments was reflected in his extreme 
levels of confidence, sometimes characterized as arrogance.93 His view of the political stage 
through the lens of complex interdependence is evidenced by his relations with a wide range of 
actors.94 His behavioral orientation toward promises and rewards over threats and punishments 
was displayed in the priority he placed on expediting the cessation of human rights abuses and 
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other suffering, not judging the relative guilt of either side in a conflict.95 As a result, he was 
accused by some of pursuing peace at any price and conceding to dictators in the interest of 
ending hostilities.96 
 The above-established profile of Carter’s operational code was valid for the first three 
years of his presidency.97 However, during his fourth year in office, it underwent a significant 
shift, as he realized that his original strategy was insufficient for dealing with catalyzing events 
such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis.98 In response, his 
cooperative view of the political universe decreased significantly in a conflictual direction, 
accompanied by a shift toward less optimism in his prospects for realizing his political values.99 
 On top of Carter’s operational code, his advisor selection and management style were 
additional factors at the individual level that affected the outcome of his grand strategy. His 
foreign policy team was a mixture of conventional and creative choices.100 For secretary of state, 
he selected Cyrus Vance, a lawyer with experience in the Defense Department during the 
Kennedy and Johnson years. For secretary of defense, he selected Harold Brown, a scientist by 
training and an expert in military technology.101 His designation of Zbigniew Brzezinski as 
National Security Advisor (NSA), which came before he named Vance his secretary of state, 
reaffirmed his determination to exercise control over foreign policy.102 With the assistance of 
Brzezinski, he sought to construct an NSC system that would avoid concentrating power in the 
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hands of one individual, while preserving the role of the White House in overseeing the foreign 
policy bureaucracy.103 Thus, he developed a new system, which was based on two committees: a 
Policy Review Committee (PRC) and a Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), with the former 
responsible for projects in the short-term and the latter responsible for those in the long-term.104  
 Carter’s options for grand strategy implementation at the domestic and systemic levels 
were impacted not only by his selection of foreign policy advisors, but also by the manner in 
which he oversaw them. On the whole, he was an ineffective leader and communicator; these 
traits were rooted less in his operational code and more in his personal characteristics. His 
inability to develop effective, managerial relationships with his foreign policy advisors and 
Democratic congressional leaders contributed to a loss of popular support and a widespread 
perception that he was a bad leader.105 While his proclivity to reduce issues to what he perceived 
to be their component parts served him well in the Camp David negotiations, for example, it was 
ill suited for directing his administration.106 In this regard, his prime failure, in terms of both 
leadership and communication, was his “Crisis of Confidence” speech and his subsequent 
botched cabinet reshuffle, through which he attempted to assert executive supremacy and employ 
moral leadership. However, these efforts only furthered his image as a naïve, idealistic president 
who lacked authority and political clout.  
Domestic Level of Analysis 
 Carter also faced domestic factors that affected how successful he could be in achieving 
his foreign policy goals, tensions among his foreign policy advisors being one of them. His 
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DMU initially consisted of Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, and UN Ambassador Andrew Young, but 
Brzezinski soon emerged as Carter’s pivotal advisor.107 However, by the second half of his term, 
fundamental conflict had emerged between Brzezinski and Vance. Brzezinski, on the one hand, 
stressed a hard-line posture toward the Soviet Union. Vance, on the other, stressed détente. 
Carter was unable to reconcile the opposing viewpoints of his principal foreign policy advisors. 
The tension, however, was nullified when Vance resigned in spring 1980 in protest of the 
administration’s failed rescue of U.S. hostages in Iran, the first time in sixty years a secretary of 
state had quit because of a policy dispute with the president. Carter named Senator Edmund S. 
Muskie as Vance’s successor.108 
 Tensions between Carter’s foreign policy advisors fed into his increasingly negative 
public perception, another domestic factor that affected how successful he could be in achieving 
his foreign policy goals. Notably, the U.S. public found fault with his critiques of foreign leaders 
on human rights grounds, which were viewed as counterproductive—though the criticisms may 
have been deserved—because some of the officials he criticized were from countries that 
supported the U.S., such as Iran, South Korea, Argentina, the Philippines, and Nicaragua.109 
Additionally, despite the fact that the president has great incentives to be pro-Israel, Carter’s 
stances on several issues led to a widespread perception that he was anti-Israel.110 The defection 
of Jewish voters, a traditionally key constituency, from the Democratic Party  
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contributed to his increasingly poor public image.111 The widespread belief that he had allowed 
the Soviets to gain an advantage in the Cold War was another vulnerability.112 The public 
criticism that Carter experienced served as a check on his grand strategy and contributed to the 
increasing delegitimization of him and his policies. 
 Carter’s inability to get some of his policies, particularly his defense programs and 
treaties, passed by Congress affected how successful he could be in achieving his foreign policy 
goals. Some of the major issues that caused friction between him and Congress were aid to 
Nicaragua, Israel, and Egypt; the Panama Canal; arms sales in the Middle East; the second round 
of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II); and Communist China.113 However, Carter did 
manage to procure the aid—totaling more than $4.8 billion in grants, arms credits, and military 
assistance—from Congress that allowed him to negotiate the Camp David Accords.114 On the 
other hand, he only succeeded in implementing the Panama Canal Treaty after accepting 
amendments, imposed by Congress, stipulating that additional talks be held with the country.115 
Congress also blocked the passage of the SALT II treaty, which sought to curtail the manufacture 
of strategic nuclear weapons and was eventually withdrawn in 1980.116   
 Ironically, the Carter administration hindered its own attempt at grand strategy 
implementation when it undercut its relationship with Congress by arguing against congressional 
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human rights efforts.117 First, legislation crafted by the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
recommended that he deny aid to nations imprisoning their own citizens for political purposes.118 
Later, in 1977, Congress put a stipulation in the economic-assistance bill that food aid would be 
withheld from nations violating human rights unless the president deemed that it would directly 
benefit the needy.119 And the legislative body, continuing to push the hot-button human rights 
issue, put a clause in the 1978 economic-assistance bill that cut security aid to countries 
demonstrating ongoing violations of human rights unless the president determined that 
extenuating circumstances required it.120 For a variety of reasons, the administration was not 
fully supportive of these provisions. This fueled tensions between Congress and the White 
House, as congressional leaders accused Carter of being all talk, no action on the human rights 
issue.121  
 Party politics also came into play in Carter’s relationship with Congress and served as 
another check on his attempt at grand strategy implementation. Although Democrats controlled 
both houses of Congress during his presidency, congressional leadership often failed to work 
with him. When he attempted to repair his relationships with Democratic congressional leaders 
18-months to two years into his term, his efforts were largely unsuccessful.122 Although he was a 
Democrat, his party alignment was never fully clear, as he sometimes supported Republican 
policies, prompting some within his own party to accuse him of “singing the Republicans’ 
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song.”123 On the other side of the aisle, he received slightly higher than expected, though not 
overwhelming support from Republicans in Congress.124 Overall, although he received more 
support than expected from Republicans, he received less than expected from Democrats, which 
hindered his ability to put his grand strategy in place.  
 All in all, Carter faced tensions among his foreign policy advisors, an uncooperative 
Congress, a weak presidency, poor public opinion, and a weak economy, a set of factors that are 
likely to inhibit a president’s attempt at grand strategy implementation. In the case of his 
presidency, because of his own personal weaknesses, he was unable to overcome these 
challenges. This ultimately inhibited his ability to implement a grand strategy. Notably, his 
failure to form effective relationships with congressional leaders contributed a lack of support for 
the SALT II treaty, which effectively neutralized his attempts to extend the scope of existing 
agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.125 On this and other issues, Carter’s personal 
qualities exacerbated the domestic constraints that he faced, resulting in his failed attempt at 
grand strategy implementation. 
Systemic Level of Analysis 
 As demonstrated, Carter’s personal political style and belief system worsened problems 
caused by an unfriendly Congress and an increasingly disenchanted public. These factors 
impeded his attempt at grand strategy implementation in light of international events. At the 
systemic level, he faced or initiated several significant events that tested whether his grand 
strategy would allow him to navigate international challenges: the Panama Canal Treaty (1977), 
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the Camp David Accords (1978), SALT II (1979), the Iran hostage crisis (1979-81), the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the energy crisis (1977-9). These events dominated his 
presidency. Focusing on the latter three events—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the energy 
crisis, and the Iran hostage crisis—provide evidence as to how his grand strategy was filtered 
through the individual and domestic levels of analysis. The goal of this analysis is to determine 
under what conditions a president can implement a grand strategy given the nature of domestic 
and international opportunities and constraints, and what the implications of doing so are for 
U.S. foreign policy. To address this question, the previously established five-prong test for 
assessing key domestic factors that affect grand strategy implementation and the two-prong test 
for measuring success at grand strategy implementation and the will be employed.  
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
 Challenges stemming from tensions among Carter’s national security advisors, poor 
public opinion, and an impermissive Congress were brought to the surface when the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1980.126 On December 27, Soviet troops attacked 
Darulaman Palace, killing Afghan President Amin and his security forces. That same day, the 
Soviets seized most of the Afghan central government facilities. They subsequently replaced 
Amin with Babrak Karmal, a relatively unknown Afghan politician who attempted to establish a 
Soviet puppet state in the country.127 Strategically, the Soviets’ timing of the invasion to coincide 
with Christmas caught the U.S. off guard and ensured a delayed reaction.128 The Soviet-installed 
Karmal government was highly illegitimate.129 Thus, the United Nations General Assembly 
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(UNGA) voted 104 to 18 to deplore the armed intervention in Afghanistan.130 Without explicitly 
naming the Soviets, the UNGA called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of 
foreign troops from the country.131  
 Carter also initiated a unilateral U.S. response to the invasion. He declared that “Soviet 
aggression in Afghanistan—unless checked—confront[ed] all the world with the most serious 
strategic challenge since the Cold War began.”132 He announced a number of anti-Soviet 
measures including: (1) blocking the export of 17 million metric tons of grain; (2) stopping the 
sale of computers and high-technology equipment to the Soviets; (3) reducing the allowable 
catch of the Soviet fishing fleet in U.S. waters from 350,000 tons to 75,000 tons; (4) delaying the 
opening of the new Soviet consulate in New York; (5) postponing a renegotiation of the cultural 
agreement that was under consideration; and (6) boycotting the Moscow Olympics.133 The grain 
embargo was particularly contentious, for the impact it had on both the U.S. and the global 
economies, though it was successful in achieving its goal of imposing a heavy price for Soviet 
aggression.134 He also withdrew the SALT II treaty from consideration by the Senate and 
announced the Carter Doctrine: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. And such an assault 
will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”135  
 Despite these measures, Carter failed to decisively push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. 
This failure was due largely to him being overwhelmed by a number of other pressing 
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international events. His failure can also be traced to his operational code and grand strategy. 
Although they had become more aggressive in response to the invasion, the policies he put in 
place never lived up to the aggrandized threats he made towards the Soviets. His failure to 
achieve success in the invasion cost him public opinion and demonstrated the failed outcome of 
his grand strategy at the international level. 
Energy Crisis 
 Before Carter could deal fully with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he was forced to 
turn his attention to the energy crisis, which served as another test of his grand strategy at the 
systemic level. Although energy issues had played a minimal role in his presidential campaign, 
upon taking office, he promptly turned his attention to the crisis.136 At the most basic level, it was 
caused by a shortage of natural gas combined with severely cold temperatures, and it was 
worsened by instability in the Middle East.137 Riots in Iran in fall 1978 had led Iranian oil 
workers to strike, bringing oil exports to a freeze. Although other Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations, namely Saudi Arabia, had begun to produce more oil to 
make up for the loss, increased consumption in the industrialized countries had led to a global 
scarcity. These issues were exacerbated when OPEC’s attempts to regulate oil supplies fell 
through, causing prices to spiral even higher.138 
 In response, Carter persuaded Congress to enact an emergency natural gas bill; he then 
turned to long-term solutions.139 First, in February 1977, he announced that he intended to put 
comprehensive energy legislation in place. He then appointed James Schlesinger, former 
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secretary of defense, as energy czar, and promised that he would produce a National Energy Plan 
(NEP) within ninety days.140 In August, Carter created the Department of Energy and appointed 
Schlesinger the first secretary of the Department.141 Then Carter deregulated energy prices, 
allowing U.S. prices to rise to world levels.142 He also put a windfall profits tax, a levy on sudden 
increases in earnings, in place, the profits from which would be used to finance alternative 
energy sources.143 
 In an effort to garner support for his energy policies, Carter delivered his “Crisis of 
Confidence” speech, officially titled “Energy and National Goals,” on July 15, 1979.144 His 
remarks, influenced by his evangelical religious convictions, chastised Americans for their 
extravagant consumption habits.145 “Too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and 
consumption,” he observed.146 “Americans,” he concluded, “had learned that piling up material 
goods [could not] fill the emptiness of lives which [had] no confidence or purpose.”147 His risky 
speech paid off; it received a largely positive reception from the American public.  
 Two days later, Carter undertook a significant restructuring of his administration. With 
the goal of restoring an image of command and control to the chief executive, he asked his 
cabinet and all senior members of his staff to offer their resignations.148 He then fired Secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Joseph Califano and accepted the resignations of 
Secretary of Treasury Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger, and Attorney 
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General Griffin Bell.149 He selected Patricia Roberts Harris, his secretary of housing and urban 
development (HUD), to replace Califano.150 He appointed George William Miller, former 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, as his new secretary of treasury and Charles William Duncan, 
Jr. as his new secretary of energy. For attorney general, he replaced Bell with Benjamin Richard 
Civiletti.151 Carter’s cabinet reshuffle represented both a bid to reassert executive supremacy and 
an attempt to win key constituency groups, particularly the southern states, in the lead up to the 
1980 election. This strategy backfired, however, as his decision to dismiss a number of his 
cabinet members was widely seen as a rash act of desperation. Thus, although his “Crisis of 
Confidence” speech had been well received, as a result of the clumsy reshuffle, his approval 
ratings had reached a new low by the end of July.152 Overall, this episode reveals his tendency to 
react to crises with soaring, moralistic rhetoric. It also reveals his penchant for giving 
suggestions to the American people, which often came across as naïve and idealistic. His 
reaction to this event was rooted in his revised operational code and grand strategy, based upon 
which he attempted to come up with decisive solutions to crises, though, as in this case, he often 
fell into the trap of doing too little, too late.  
Iran Hostage Crisis 
 Carter was faced with another jarring systemic level event that tested the outcome of his 
grand strategy when demonstrations broke out in Iran, one of the United States’ strongest allies 
in the Middle East. Throughout his first year in office, he had been a steadfast supporter of the 
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Shah.153 By early 1978, however, there was evidence that opposition to the Shah’s regime was 
spreading, and that his overthrow was a serious possibility.154 As a result, on November 9, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Iran suggested that the U.S. look for measures of maintaining its interests in 
Iran, in case the Shah’s regime should be overthrown.155  
 These warnings came to fruition on December 29, when the Shah announced his selection 
of Shahpour Bakhtiar as Prime Minister.156 As a condition of taking office, Bakhtiar stipulated 
that the Shah should leave the country.157 Thus, on January 16, 1979, the Shah left Iran for Egypt, 
insisting that that Iranian people would call him back to rule.158 Then, on February 1, Ayatollah 
Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister.159 When the Shah got cancer in 
October, Carter made the critical decision to let him come to the U.S. for medical treatment.160 It 
was ultimately this decision that allowed for the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.161 On 
November 4, it was attacked and captured by a mob of militant demonstrators.162 Consequently, 
sixty-three American officials were left at the mercy of this small group of militants, who 
suddenly found themselves at the center of the world political arena.163 Carter’s first decisive 
policy decision was to prohibit U.S. companies from buying oil from Iran; a week later, he 
broadened the scope of the restriction to include imports and exports of other products from the 
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country.164 He then announced the most severe economic sanction, a freeze on Iranian assets on 
deposit in U.S. banks.165 
 In calculating a response to the crisis, Carter placed a high value on protecting the lives 
of the hostages.166 He succeeded in getting thirteen of them released—the women and the blacks 
of the group—on November 19.167 Subsequently, on April 7, 1980 the U.S. formally broke 
diplomatic relations with Iran, and on April 17 he announced a ban on all exports to the country 
and the U.S. government’s seizure of the Iranian assets frozen in U.S. banks.168 With tensions 
mounting, he decided to go forward with a helicopter rescue of the hostages.169 The mission, 
which was undertaken on April 24, had to be aborted early, however, after three of the 
helicopters malfunctioned; receiving this information, he had no choice but to call off the 
attempt.170 Then, one of the helicopters crashed into an aircraft when it was refueling for its flight 
home, tragically killing eight Americans.171 By early September, Iran’s interest in the hostages 
had significantly diminished.172 Thus, on January 20, 1981, Iran and the U.S. reached an 
agreement in which the U.S. gave Iran approximately $8 billion, and the exchange of fifty-two 
hostages for cash took place just after noon—the same day that Reagan was sworn into office.173  
 The Iran hostage crisis had been a decisive failure for Carter’s grand strategy. During the 
crisis, which lasted for 444 days, he was overloaded with Panama Canal treaties in the Senate, 
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the post-Camp David negotiations, talks with China, and the continuing SALT discussions.174 
Nonetheless, he felt the plight of the hostages deeply. Thus, he worked with key advisors through 
the last night of his presidency, desperately trying to bring about the hostages’ release before 
Reagan was sworn in.175 Despite the fact that he had agreed not to campaign until the hostages 
were rescued, the 1980 election was clearly on his mind.176  
 Before attempting to rescue the hostages militarily, Carter tried to resolve the crisis 
diplomatically. Overall, his decision making during the crisis was defined by a failure to take 
timely, decisive action.177 Thus, by the time he settled on a helicopter rescue mission, the 
hostages had already been in custody for more than a year, a long national nightmare. At this 
point in his presidency, he also faced increasingly poor public opinion and worsening 
relationships with Congress. His delay in undertaking a military rescue was rooted in his 
operational code and grand strategy, which guided his inaction. Although they had shifted to 
become more hawkish in nature, he still preferred diplomatic solutions to military ones. 
Nevertheless, his prolonged inaction, followed by the failed hostage rescue mission, cost him 
public support and demonstrated the failed outcome of his grand strategy at the international 
level. 
 As demonstrated, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the energy crisis, and the Iran 
hostage crisis challenged Carter’s core beliefs, prompting him to adjust his operational code and 
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grand strategy. These systemic level tests existed on top of the individual and domestic level 
challenges that he faced. Further, these events proved impossible to resolve in light of his 
inability to navigate domestic politics effectively, highlighting the idealism of his grand strategy. 
His failure to come to a timely, decisive solution in response to the Soviet invasion, the energy 
crisis, and the Iran hostage crisis speaks to the inability of his grand strategy, which had been 
filtered through the factors at the individual and domestic levels, to stand up to the tests of the 
global system. 
Assessment of Grand Strategy 
 Ultimately, the American public did not understand the linkage between Carter’s efforts 
to limit U.S. commitments abroad and the ethical rhetoric of his foreign policy.178 As a result, he 
was forced to moderate his original absolutist human rights grand strategy in favor of a more 
hawkish approach. Comparing his key decisions in dealing with the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the energy crisis, and the Iran hostage crisis provides evidence of this. Whereas his 
initial operational code and grand strategy were highly cooperative in nature, after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, he was not afraid to take decisive action to address Soviet 
encroachment and other systemic challenges. Upon realizing that his initial grand strategy was 
inappropriate for dealing with global realities, his grand strategy, though still rooted in the 
human rights paradigm, became more security-focused. However, his attempt to implement a 
modified grand strategy also backfired, as Congress and the American public saw many of his 
later decisions as rash. They also continued to hold him to the standards established by the 
soaring human rights rhetoric of his original strategy, even after it had shifted.  
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 While the roots of Carter’s inability to implement a grand strategy can be traced to his 
operational code, failure must also be ascribed to the domestic and systemic variables that 
hindered his success. The systemic events he faced represented the culmination of a series of 
political and economic catastrophes that began in the mid-1960s.179 At the domestic level, he 
faced conflicts within his own administration, an uncooperative, though Democratically-
controlled Congress, diminished presidential power, low public approval, and a weak economy 
that hindered his ability to prepare for and respond to these challenges. The hostage crisis and 
other failures at the international level eroded domestic public support for his grand strategy and 
ultimately destroyed any hope he had of winning the 1980 election. 
 In assessing Carter’s presidency according to the earlier established five-prong test for 
evaluating domestic factors, he faced: (1) tensions among his foreign policy advisors; (2) a 
Democratically-controlled Congress in all but the final year of his presidency; (3) an 
institutionally weak presidency as a result of Watergate and Vietnam; (4) widespread public 
disapproval; and (5) a weak domestic economy and rising oil prices. Overall, this assessment 
demonstrates that the domestic factors critical to grand strategy implementation were almost all 
working against Carter; any potential benefits to be reaped from working with a Democratically-
controlled Congress—the only significant factor that could have worked in his favor—were 
mitigated by his poor relationships with congressional leaders.  
 Based on the two-prong test for determining whether a president has succeeded in grand 
strategy implementation: (1) U.S. foreign policy during Carter’s presidency rarely aligned with 
his grand strategy; and (2) when he did manage to put policies in place that aligned with his 
grand strategy, their outcomes were rarely positive. Thus, his attempt at grand strategy 
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implementation was a failure on both counts. In fact, from his failed rescue of the Iran hostages 
to his battles with Congress, nearly his entire policy record is a failure, with the exclusion of the 
Camp David Accords, his only major foreign policy achievement. Carter’s failure can be 
explained by a set of interconnected factors at the individual, domestic, and system levels of 
analysis that impacted each other, and ultimately blocked his attempt at grand strategy 
implementation. 
 Carter’s loss to Ronald Reagan in 1980 underscored his failed grand strategy and his 
position as one of the least effective and least popular presidents in U.S. history. Although he 
came into office with a clear grand strategy vision, both his original strategy and his revised one 
fell victim to individual, domestic, and systemic realities. His administration serves as a case 
study of the conditions that make it impossible for a president to put a grand strategy in place: 
lack of an easily implemented idea; an impermissive domestic environment rooted in presidential 
unpopularity, poor leadership, and partisan opposition; and international reaction rather than 
leadership. 
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Bush’s Foreign Policy (2001-2008) 
 
“I’m the decider, and I decide what is best.”  
      —George W. Bush 
 
Characterization of Foreign Policy 
 George W. Bush formally unveiled his grand strategy—the Bush Doctrine—in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The day of the attacks represented a turning point for 
Bush, who was forced to turn his focus to international concerns. In their aftermath, he 
transitioned from a domestically oriented president who had undertaken education and Social 
Security reform early in his first term, to a war president with an explicit grand strategy. Bush’s 
grand strategy covered all aspects of foreign policy and reflected his view of what U.S. foreign 
policy should achieve.180 Two elements—American primacy and preemptive war—captured the 
essential ends and means, respectively, of the Bush Doctrine. The first, American primacy, 
viewed the political universe as unipolar, with the U.S. possessing the right and responsibility to 
serve as the hegemon.181 The second, preemptive war, advocated for striking first against 
enemies determined to inflict harm on the U.S.182  
 At its core, the Bush Doctrine sought to give the public a clear sense of the threats to the 
U.S.183 It eschewed environmentalism, national building, and negotiations in favor of crisis 
diplomacy. It redefined military threats by emphasizing just three states—Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea—whose efforts to attain nuclear weapons constituted an axis of evil.184 Rooted in 
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neoconservatism, Bush’s grand strategy sought to achieve global democratization via military 
unilateralism.185 According to P. Edward Haley, professor of international relations at Claremont 
McKenna College, what is different about Bush’s foreign policy record is that unlike his 
predecessors, who treated the concepts of preventive war and democracy promotion as 
boilerplate rhetoric, he acted on these concepts.186 Accordingly, he was not afraid to show 
contempt for traditional U.S. allies, flout international opinion, and bypass multilateral 
institutions to act on his sense of intuitive moralist activism.187 Overall, Bush’s grand strategy 
was aggressive, hegemonic, and preemptive in nature, and it advocated for the restoration of 
security.188 
 Insight into the outcome of Bush’s attempt at grand strategy implementation can be found 
at the individual, domestic and systemic levels of analysis. At the individual level, examination 
of Bush’s operational code is crucial to understanding his grand strategy, as his grand strategy 
was directly impacted by his operational code. Such an examination shows that his original 
operational code was fairly cooperative. However, following the September 11 attacks, the 
negative, conflictual elements of his worldview became significantly more pronounced. His 
grand strategy was a product of the attacks, prior to which he possessed a set of beliefs about the 
international system, but not a grand strategy. Also at the individual level, his selection and 
management of foreign policy advisors affected his options for grand strategy implementation at 
the domestic and systemic levels.  
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 At the domestic level, Bush faced a number of factors that facilitated his attempt at grand 
strategy implementation. Based on the five-prong test for assessing domestic factors, he was 
confronted with: (1) a divided, decentralized foreign policy team; (2) a highly permissive 
Congress; (3) increased presidential power in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks; (4) 
positive public opinion; and (5) a strong domestic economy. These domestic factors are 
connected to those at the individual level in that they impacted his foreign policy decisions. They 
are also interrelated with those at the systemic level because they impacted how effectively he 
could respond to international events. 
 At the systemic level, Bush faced the September 11 attacks and initiated the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, a series of events that caused him to develop a grand strategy and then 
tested its outcome. These systemic tests are connected to factors at the individual level in that 
they caused a shift in his operational code. They are also interrelated with those at the domestic 
level because they capitalized on a permissive domestic environment. Based on the two-prong 
test for evaluating grand strategy success, he: (1) successfully implemented policies that aligned 
with his grand strategy; and (2) when he implemented policies that aligned with his grand 
strategy, often had negative outcomes. He had an overall permissive package: his worldview, 
which developed into a grand strategy, partnered with domestic opportunities, facilitated his 
ability to respond effectively to international events. Ultimately, though, while he passed the test 
for successful grand strategy implementation, his grand strategy was not successful in that it 
damaged the global standing of the U.S.  
Individual Level of Analysis 
 
 Understanding Bush’s operational code is critical to comprehending his grand strategy, as 
the two are closely connected. In a study of his operational code, Jonathan Renshon presents an 
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analysis for four separate phases of his political career: (1) the immediate pre-presidential phase; 
(2) his nine months in office prior to September 11; (3) the six months immediately following the 
terrorist attacks; and (4) his last year in office as a second-term president.189 For his analysis, 
Renshon gathered content from all of Bush’s public speeches that were at least 1,500 words long 
and focused primarily on foreign policy.190 Renshon’s analysis reveals that Bush initially held 
beliefs typical to other U.S. leaders regarding the image of the international system and the 
ability to realize his political values.191 He also held a moderately strong, positive belief in the 
use of cooperation toward achieving his policy objectives. Regarding role conceptions, he saw 
the image of the self as more cooperative that that of the other. Hence, he saw himself as a 
benevolent leader in a somewhat friendly system.192 During his first nine months in office, his 
worldview was surprisingly cooperative.193 His stance toward Russia is illustrative of this; while 
foreign policy advisors Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Condoleezza Rice were busy 
condemning Russia, Bush took a more cooperative stance. Moreover, optimism and confidence 
were key components of his personality. Thus, gaining more power to accomplish his goals in 
the form of the presidency reinforced his beliefs about the cooperative nature of the political 
system.194  
 Following the September 11 attacks, Bush’s operational code changed substantially, with 
his view of the political universe becoming more negative.195 He experienced a dramatic belief 
reversal, with his views on the Nature of the Political Universe, Realization of Political Values, 
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and Predictability of Political Future all changing significantly.196 Additionally, he came to view 
the political universe as less predictable and became more pessimistic in his beliefs concerning 
his prospects for realizing his political goals.197 On the whole, his operational code was defined 
by a shift in risk orientation, as he transitioned from more risk averse (as governor) to steadily 
more risk acceptant throughout his two administrations.198  
 According to an analysis by Robert Jervis, professor of politics at Columbia University, 
Bush was a pragmatic and consensus-minded individual who saw American leadership as 
restricted to defending narrow and traditional vital interests.199 On a personal level, his training in 
the business world guided his leadership style, particularly his tendency to delegate the conduct 
of foreign policy to others, such as Vice President Cheney or to various cabinet officials, such as 
the secretaries of state and defense—a practice that earned him his nickname of the “MBA 
President” early in his first term.200 His evangelicalism also had a significant impact on his 
operational code. Most famously, when asked in a candidate debate to name his favorite 
philosopher, he immediately answered, “Christ, because he changed my heart.”201 Bush’s 
religiosity remained a dominant force throughout his presidency and had a strong influence on 
his grand strategy.202 
 In ascertaining how Bush formulated his grand strategy, it is important to understand the 
link between operational code and grand strategy. A shift in his operational code also entailed a 
shift in his worldview or grand strategy. His initial operational code was fairly cooperative and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
196  Ibid., 835, 837. 
197  Ibid., 837 
198  Ibid. 
199  Robinson, 102. 
200  Ibid., 105. 
201  Mark J. Rozell, “Introduction: Religion and the Bush Presidency,” in Religion and the 
Bush Presidency (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1. 
202  Ibid., 2. 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 52 
optimistic, which translated into a cooperative worldview that influenced his original foreign 
policy prerogatives. Yet, after the September 11 attacks, he was forced to turn his attention to 
international events, and he operational code shifted accordingly. This resulted in the 
development of a grand strategy that reflected the aggressive nature of his modified operational 
code. The relative strengths and weakness of the Bush Doctrine were colored by his modified 
operational code.  
 On top of Bush’s operational code, his advisor selection and management style were 
additional factors at the individual level that affected the outcome of his grand strategy. In 
selecting the top three foreign policy posts in his administration, he chose from his father’s 
generation: Dick Cheney as vice president, Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense, and Colin 
Powell as secretary of state.203 All three were strong-willed, experienced, and Washington 
savvy.204 Cheney, who had served as secretary of defense in the first Bush administration, was a 
staunch conservative.205 Rumsfeld had been Richard Nixon’s defense secretary twenty-five years 
earlier, and had reestablished himself through participating in various conservative study groups 
that had attacked Bill Clinton’s policies in the 1990s.206 Powell was a former NSA and head of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who had coined the Powell Doctrine: “The use of force should be 
restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of 
lives and other costs that will surely ensue.”207 Another of Bush’s key foreign policy advisors, 
Condoleezza Rice, had formerly served as the director of Soviet and East European Affairs on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
203  Haley, 132. 
204  Ibid. 
205  Ibid., 133. 
206  Ibid. 
207  Ibid., 134. 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 53 
Bush Sr.’s NSC.208 Known for her realpolitik outlook, Rice was appointed by Bush Jr. as NSA. 
“Bush and Condoleezza Rice were an odd couple: the tightly wound, upwardly mobile, middle-
class, African-American, intellectual female, and the rich, recovering alcoholic who had found 
religion.”209 Despite their differences, the two worked well together, and after winning reelection 
in 2004, Bush made her his secretary of state. 
 Bush’s options for grand strategy implementation at the domestic and systemic levels 
were impacted not only by his selection of foreign policy advisors, but also by the manner in 
which he oversaw them. He employed a management style that fit the deep divide that existed 
among his advisors. As such, the Bush national security team worked in a generally closed 
system, where information flowed within the circle, but conflicting information was only rarely 
allowed inside.210 His insistence upon group cohesion led even those within the group—such as 
Powell—to censor their comments in order to remain within the inner circle.211 In this way, Bush 
created an environment in which the preferences of the dominant in-group—the hawks—were 
often privileged over those of the out-group. While his grand strategy was tied to his operational 
code, his great reliance upon some of his foreign policy advisors mitigated the relationship 
between his operational code and his grand strategy. Thus, the Bush Doctrine could very well 
have been called the Cheney Doctrine or the Rumsfeld Doctrine, as he relied heavily upon the 
neoconservatives within his administration, particularly with regard to the Iraq War. 
Domestic Level of Analysis 
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 Bush also faced domestic factors that affected how successful he could be in achieving 
his foreign policy goals, a divide among his foreign policy advisors being one of them. Early in 
his first term, his foreign policy advisors dubbed their team the “Vulcans,” in honor of the 
Roman god of fire.212 With the nickname, they hoped to convey a sense of power and 
durability.213 In reality, however, they had strong and conflicting views about what the 
administration’s foreign policy priorities should be.214 As a result, deep differences emerged 
among them immediately. And because Bush had limited foreign policy experience, he often 
relied heavily upon them to help establish policy and to teach him about international affairs.215 
Thus, during the first months of his presidency, their conflicting positions paralyzed U.S. foreign 
policy, but for a domestically oriented president, the standstill was not necessarily a bad thing. 
 The divide among Bush’s advisors remained for the rest of his presidency and became a 
hallmark of his administration. On one side stood the neoconservatives who advocated for 
unilateral action, and on the other were the realists who believed that U.S. interests were best 
served by a policy of multilateralism.216 Within the inner sphere of the DMU, there was a decider 
(Bush) and a highly influential codecider (Cheney)—dubbed Bush’s co-president by some.217 
The outer sphere of the DMU was split into a hawkish in-group dominated by Cheney and 
Rumsfeld and a more moderate, dovish out-group led by Powell.218 After the September 11 
attacks, Bush sided increasingly with the in-group—the hawks, as they are known—although he 
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did occasionally choose to go with the doves.219 On Iraq, for example, though he initially favored 
Powell’s multilateralist approach, the in-group later came to dominate the decision making 
process. As a result, he ultimately chose to undertake a military intervention. The in-group also 
dominated decision making regarding North Korea, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.220 
The policy preferences of the in-group were more closely aligned with his grand strategy than 
those of the out-group. Thus, particularly after his grand strategy came to fruition in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Bush relied heavily on Cheney, Rumsfeld, and other 
hawks in the administration. 
 Despite having to deal with a deeply divided foreign policy team, Bush enjoyed expanded 
presidential power in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, another domestic factor that 
affected how successful he could be in achieving his foreign policy goals. The September 11 
rally effect—the sudden and substantial increase in public approval of the president that occurred 
in response to the attacks—permitted him to launch his War on Terrorism without delay.221 In 
fact, the September 11 rally effect was the largest ever recorded; this is evidenced by the fact that 
his approval rating jumped in the Gallup poll from 51% on September 10 to 86% on September 
15. Further, Bush’s 90% approval rating, recorded on September 22, is the highest rating ever 
recorded for a U.S. president.222  
 Most significantly, the September 11 rally effect allowed Bush to form a new basis for 
U.S. foreign policy.223 Nine days after the attacks, he articulated his new grand strategy and 
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announced the start of the global War on Terrorism to Congress.224 He further detailed his grand 
strategy in his 2002 State of the Union address, in which he declared that the U.S. confronted an 
axis of evil consisting of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.225 According to Bush, “The task before the 
nation went far beyond simply capturing Osama bin Laden and putting al Qaeda out of 
business.”226 A global fight against terrorism had to be mounted on all fronts.227  
 The September 11 attacks allowed Bush to win not only popular support, but also 
congressional approval for his new foreign policy paradigm, another domestic factor that 
affected how successful he could be in accomplishing his foreign policy objectives. The 
relationship between the Bush White House and Congress exemplified the power of a 
commander in chief during wartime.228 Overall, due largely to the rally effect and a booming 
national economy, he managed to get most of his foreign and defense policies passed by 
Congress.229 Notably, less than a week after the attacks, Congress passed the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the terrorists, which granted him the authority to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against the terrorists and those who harbored or assisted them.230 
The measure passed by 98-0 in the Senate and 420-1 in the House of Representatives.231  
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 Congress also passed sweeping domestic security legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act, 
which was signed into law on October 26, after passing 98-1 in the Senate and 356-66 in the 
House.232 The Patriot Act lowered the threshold for antiterrorism surveillance and broke down 
much of the division between domestic and international intelligence gathering and between 
intelligence and law enforcement. The congressional support Bush received in favor of his 
counterterrorism policies demonstrates that he was operating in a new paradigm of presidential 
power, with Article II of the Constitution permitting—indeed obliging—him to do whatever he 
deemed necessary to protect the nation.233 At the time of the attacks, Republicans controlled the 
House and Democrats the Senate. Despite the fact that Bush faced a divided Congress, a 
domestic factor that had the potential to hinder how successful he could be in achieving his 
foreign policy goals, the 107th Congress came together in support of most of his policies. Later, 
during his second term, he faced a second divided Congress, which proved less cooperative than 
the 107th. Thus, while Congress initially facilitated Bush’s attempt at grand strategy 
implementation, as time went on, the legislative body made it increasingly difficult for him to 
implement his grand strategy.  
Systemic Level of Analysis 
 As established, Bush’s political style and belief system allowed him to capitalize on a 
friendly Congress and a boost in public opinion. These domestic factors facilitated his attempt at 
grand strategy implementation in light of international events. At the systemic level, he faced the 
September 11 attacks (2001) and initiated the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) 
and the North Korean nuclear disarmament negotiations (2004), events that tested whether his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
232  Gottlieb, 119. 
233  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, 279; Gottlieb, 119. 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 58 
grand strategy would allow him to navigate international challenges. Focusing on the September 
11 attacks and the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq shed light on how his responses to 
these events were filtered through factors at the individual and domestic levels of analysis. The 
goal of this analysis is to determine under what conditions a president can implement a grand 
strategy given the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints, and what 
the implications of doing so are for U.S. foreign policy. To address this question, the previously 
established two-prong test for measuring success at grand strategy implementation and the five-
prong test for assessing key domestic factors that affect grand strategy implementation will be 
employed. 
September 11 Attacks 
 Bush’s defining moment came on the morning of September 11, 2001, when nineteen 
terrorists turned four hijacked airliners into weapons of mass destruction. Their attacks targeted 
New York and Washington, DC, America’s commercial and political centers, respectively.234 
The four jets took off over a two-hour period, two from Boston, one from Washington, and one 
from Newark. Each was hijacked shortly after takeoff. The first left Boston for Los Angeles but 
changed course toward New York City and flew into the north tower of the World Trade Center 
(WTC) in lower Manhattan.235 Eighteen minutes later, the second plane crashed into the south 
tower.236 Half an hour after that, the third crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth crash-landed in 
Pennsylvania. A total of 266 people were killed in the four planes. In the aftermath of the attacks, 
the world was transfixed by images of the crippled WTC. The south tower fell first, at 10:05am, 
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followed by the north tower at 10:28.237 That night, in a televised address to the nation, Bush 
declared the attacks an act of war.238 In the address, he announced the widening of the U.S. 
response to terrorism to include not just the terrorists who had committed the attacks, but also 
those who had sponsored and supported them.239 In the weeks and months that followed, he 
capitalized on the nearly unconditional support that he received from Congress and the U.S. 
public to implement a wide-ranging counterterrorism policy.  
 In a significant expansion of presidential power, Bush issued a series of Executive Orders 
authorizing aggressive action on a range of issues, including the creation of secret CIA prisons; 
the permitting of enhanced interrogations of captured terrorists; the expansion of the CIA’s 
rendition program; a secret domestic terrorism surveillance program; a secret program to search 
private international banking transactions; and a directive for the U.S. military and the CIA to 
engage in covert targeted assassinations of terrorist leaders.240 Additionally, the U.S. military 
base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was designated as a detention center for suspected terrorists. The 
administration argued that international law did not cover such detainees, as non-state, enemy 
combatants.241 As a result of these directives, Bush has been accused of serving as an imperial 
president. Coined by Arthur M. Schlesinger, the term describes the gradual but significant 
growth in executive power.242 According to some, Bush took the imperial presidency to an 
unprecedented level. Presidential scholar Allan Lichtman, for example, argues that he sent the 
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expansion of presidential power into the stratosphere.243 Critics of the Bush administration 
contend that he overstepped his authority in invoking sweeping emergency powers in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, losing sight of civil liberties and international law in the 
process.   
 Regardless, for Bush, the attacks were a turning point that brought about a grand strategy 
of aggressive, preemptive unilateralism. His actions in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, 
namely the passage of the AUMF and the Patriot Act, were among his first significant, public 
actions inspired by his grand strategy. In considering whether other presidents would have taken 
the same actions in the aftermath of the attacks, it is clear that given their severity, both in human 
and economic costs and to the U.S. psyche, the attacks demanded decisive action on the part of 
the executive, though not necessarily the same actions that Bush took. The attacks served as a 
systemic level test that determined whether his grand strategy would allow him to navigate 
international challenges. With his revised operational code and new grand strategy as his point of 
reference, his immediate reaction to the attacks showed that he was willing to do whatever it 
would take to protect the homeland and punish those responsible. 
 The invasion of Afghanistan was another event that tested whether the Bush Doctrine 
could achieve success. Within hours of the attacks, the administration had identified al Qaeda, a 
global militant Islamist organization based in Afghanistan, as responsible.244 Al Qaeda, like other 
Islamist terrorist groups, was conducting jihad (holy war) against the West.245 Composed largely 
of disenchanted extremists, al Qaeda had at least sixty cells across the globe in 2001.246 The 
group’s leader, Osama bin Laden, had joined with other Islamic fundamentalists in establishing 
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the Taliban, a state in Afghanistan rooted in a strict interpretation of sharia law, which provided 
support and sanctuary to al Qaeda.247  
 In order to bring down the Taliban regime and fight a successful war against al Qaeda, 
the U.S. would have to abandon its traditional approaches to warfare, in which wars were won by 
sheer military strength.248 It would have to successfully coordinate its intelligence, diplomacy, 
and homeland security efforts; doing so required allies to provide intelligence, military assets, 
and support in international organizations.249 With this in mind, defense strategists devised a war 
plan that would involve two phases: first the U.S. and its allies would target the Taliban regime, 
then it would focus on al Qaeda cells in other parts of the world.250 This strategy aligned closely 
with Bush’s grand strategy, particularly its emphasis on the right of the U.S., as the global 
hegemon, to wage preemptive war on threats to its national security.  
  Accordingly, American and British bombing raids began in October.251 They 
successfully disabled the Taliban’s transportation and communications infrastructure.252 As a 
result, on November 12, Kabul fell into the hands of the U.S. military, and an interim 
government and peacekeeping force were established.253 A new innovation in military 
technology, unmanned intelligence and attack drones, aided the bombing campaign.254 An 
estimated 15,000 enemy troops were killed in the fighting, and approximately 7,000 others were 
sent to Guantanamo Bay.255 In the second phase of the war, Bush undertook the task of bringing 
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the al Qaeda leaders to justice. The goal of the mission was to round up the terrorists, including 
bin Laden, as they fled from their headquarters, but the mission failed. In the battle at Tora Bora, 
U.S. special forces were overtaken, allowing al Qaeda operatives to cross into Pakistan. And Bin 
Laden, still a major threat to the U.S., escaped despite a reward of $5 million for his capture.256 
 Overall, the invasion of Afghanistan was inspired by Bush’s modified operational code 
and grand strategy. Presumably, other presidents would have undertaken similar action, as the 
invasion’s goals of bringing down the Taliban regime and capturing al Qaeda militants were 
directly related to countering the terrorist threat. Thus, it is not Bush’s launch of the war in 
Afghanistan that is unique to his grand strategy, but the way in which he packaged his decision 
as a necessary component of the War on Terror and of his grand strategy. Yet, with regard to 
Afghanistan, just because he succeeded in putting U.S. policies in place that closely aligned with 
in his grand strategy does not mean that this case was necessarily a success for the Bush 
Doctrine. For the war in Afghanistan dragged on, at a much higher economic and human cost 
than expected, for more than twelve years, outliving his presidency itself. 
Invasion of Iraq  
 The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was another significant event that tested whether Bush’s 
grand strategy could achieve success. By fall 2002, his key foreign policy advisors agreed on the 
need to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but they disagreed on how the U.S. should go 
about doing it.257 Whereas Cheney and Rumsfeld, of the in-group, advocated for military 
intervention, Powell, of the out-group, supported a multilateral, diplomatic approach that would 
empower the Iraqis to overthrow Saddam themselves.258 Thus, Bush was forced to choose 
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between these two proposed strategies.259 In his 2003 State of the Union address, he laid out the 
reasons why the U.S. should go to war with Iraq: (1) the cruelty of Saddam against his own 
people; (2) his flouting of treaties and resolutions; (3) the military threat that he posed to his 
neighbors; and (4) his ties to al Qaeda.260 As the crux of his justification for the invasion, Bush 
cited intelligence confirming that Saddam had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Thus, 
Bush continued to push for multilateral intervention in Iraq by stepping up his efforts to press 
Security Council members to vote in favor of a joint U.S.-UK proposal authorizing military 
intervention. When only Spain and Bulgaria agreed and the proposal fell five votes short of the 
required nine, he pledged that the U.S. did not need authorization from the international 
community to undertake a military invasion.261 As promised, he gathered a “Coalition of the 
Willing,” consisting of the countries that supported the invasion.262  
 On March 19, a U.S.-led force began its invasion of Iraq.263 American and British forces 
soon overwhelmed the Iraqi militias, paramilitary forces, and Republican Guard and seized 
control of the major cities at a rapid pace.264 A sustained bombing campaign, dubbed “shock and 
awe” by U.S. military commanders, coincided with a massive ground offensive from Kuwait 
through the desert to Baghdad. On April 9, cheering Iraqis and U.S. Marines toppled a statue of 
Saddam. While the initial stages of the invasion had been successful, U.S.-led troops were left to 
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stay and establish democratic institutions in a country where the conditions for achieving 
democracy were far from favorable.265  
 The invasion of Iraq was the defining moment for the Bush Doctrine. Whereas other 
presidents may have undertaken a similar response in the direct aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, Iraq is what set Bush’s grand strategy apart from others presidents’ foreign policy 
strategies. The invasion is a direct product of his grand strategy, as evidenced by its preemptive, 
unilateral nature. That he went forward with the invasion without authorization from the 
international community, a bold move that reflected the shift in his operational code, shows that 
neoconservative elements within his administration—namely Cheney and Rumsfeld—had come 
to dominate the policymaking process. Yet, just because he managed to put U.S. policy in place 
in Iraq that aligned closely with his grand strategy does not mean that this case was a success for 
the Bush Doctrine. As in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq was highly costly to the U.S., 
economically as well as in human lives and international opinion. 
Assessment of Grand Strategy 
 In assessing Bush’s attempt at grand strategy implementation, it is clear that after the 
September 11 attacks, the negative, conflictual elements of his worldview became more 
pronounced. Before the attacks, he was a domestically-focused president who had tackled 
education and Social Security reform in the wake of the 2002 presidential election. Afterwards, 
he became a war president, launching successive wars first in Afghanistan and later Iraq and 
instituting a new foreign policy platform of preemptive, unilateral military action.266 The Bush 
Doctrine came to fruition in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Its implementation was facilitated 
by a number of checks and balances at the domestic level that fell out of place during his 
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presidency, creating an unusually permissive domestic environment for grand strategy 
implementation. At the international level, a number of tests assessed how his grand strategy 
would stand when confronted by external imperatives. His decisions surrounding the September 
11 attacks and the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, keystones of his global War on 
Terror, were directly influenced by his grand strategy. On the whole, Bush was successful in 
implementing his grand strategy in the sense that U.S. policy frequently reflected the Bush 
Doctrine. This was due largely to domestic factors that allowed him to implement his grand 
strategy with relative ease. These factors, all of which had the potential to derail his attempt at 
grand strategy implementation, aligned during his presidency, resulting in the Bush Doctrine 
being put in place relatively unchecked.  
 In assessing Bush’s presidency according to the earlier established five-prong test for 
evaluating domestic factors, he faced: (1) a deeply split DMU; (2) a divided Congress during 
year one, a Republican-controlled Congress during years two and three, and a Democratically-
controlled Congress during year four of his presidency; (3) an institutionally strong presidency as 
a result of the September 11 attacks; (4) extremely strong public support due to the rally effect; 
and (5) a healthy domestic economy. Overall, this assessment demonstrates that three out of five 
of the domestic factors critical to grand strategy implementation were decidedly working in 
Bush’s favor; he was able to overcome the one that was not—a strong, unified team of foreign 
policy advisors—by means of his selective management style.  
 Based on the two-prong test for determining whether a president has succeeded in grand 
strategy implementation: (1) U.S. foreign policy during Bush’s presidency often aligned with his 
grand strategy; and (2) the policies he put in place that aligned with his grand strategy rarely had 
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positive outcomes. He had an overall permissive package: his worldview, partnered with 
domestic opportunities, strengthened his ability to respond effectively to international events.  
Thus, while Bush’s grand strategy is inherently difficult to assess because it encompassed a 
number of long-term goals that transcended his presidency, based on this test, it is clear that he 
had positive results in terms of implementation. However, in terms of the outcomes of his 
implementation, his results were mixed and arguably more negative, signaling a problem with 
the strategy itself. While he succeeded in putting his grand strategy in place, in the long run, it 
harmed the standing of the U.S.; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were longer and more costly 
than anticipated and led to a global surge in anti-American sentiment. These results can be 
explained by a set of interconnected factors at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of 
analysis that impacted each other, and ultimately facilitated Bush’s attempt at grand strategy 
implementation. 
 Bush developed a clear, logically coherent, and well-defined grand strategy after the 
September 11 attacks.267 But these characteristics did not make it a good one, and its 
implementation led to more harm than good.268 In fact, the Bush Doctrine not only became 
politically unpopular, but it put the U.S. on an unsustainable long-term path. While Bush’s grand 
strategy had been designed to stabilize the international system by asserting the benevolent 
intentions of its most powerful state, it appeared to have the opposite effect, particularly with 
regard to Iraq.269 When no WMD were discovered in the country, the Iraq War and the ensuing 
wave of anti-Americanism subjected him to harsh national and international scrutiny.270 From 
nearly universal sympathy in the weeks after the September 11 attacks, the U.S. within a year 
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and a half found itself widely regarded as an international pariah.271 Nevertheless, Bush 
consistently asserted the correctness of his policies and his bold decision to undertake a full-scale 
military conflict in Iraq.272 For better or for worse, the Bush Doctrine disregarded the principle 
that the margins of American advantage are not so great as to allow the U.S. to wage unilateral 
war whenever it chooses.273 His administration serves as a case study of the conditions that make 
it relatively easy for a president to put a grand strategy—though not necessarily a good one—in 
place: a clear, easily implemented idea; a permissive domestic environment rooted bipartisan 
support; and international leadership in the face of crisis. 
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Obama’s Foreign Policy (2008-2012) 
“I reject the notion that the American moment has passed…I still believe that America is the last, 
best hope of Earth. We just have to show the world why this is so.”  
      —Barack Obama 
 
“When you start applying blanket policies on the complexities of the current world situation, 
you’re going to get yourself into trouble.” 
      —Barack Obama 
 
Characterization of Foreign Policy 
 
 If there is one idea that sums up Barack Obama’s first term foreign policy, it is 
engagement.274 His grand strategy—the Obama Doctrine—called for redefining American 
leadership in an increasingly globalized world and engaging with a multitude of state and non-
state actors such as NGOs and other transnational groups in the international system. It placed a 
high value on working with allies and within multilateral institutions under the auspices of global 
governance and international law.275 He was a strong proponent of the belief that the U.S. must 
accept the constraints of working within these institutions to achieve its international goals, and 
that it must seek legitimacy in its attempts to protect its vital interests.276 His grand strategy 
envisioned the world not as multipolar, but as multipartner, and it attempted to effectively 
reset—even transform—U.S. foreign policy.277 
 Accordingly, the best-known phrase that articulates Obama’s grand strategy is “leading 
from behind.”278 Based on this paradigm, he advocated for avoiding international entanglements 
unless they were absolutely vital to U.S. national interests. He embraced the tenet that when 
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undertaking a foreign intervention, it was essential that the U.S. seek authority from the 
international community and partner with allies, using a “light footprint” strategy. In this way, 
the Obama Doctrine is distinct from the Bush Doctrine. Whereas the Bush Doctrine advocated 
for upholding American primary and promoting democracy at any price, even in the face of 
international disapproval, Obama’s grand strategy sought to move away from the unilateral 
rhetoric of the War on Terror. His grand strategy also advocated for the use of soft power. It 
espoused transformational diplomacy, based on the idea that influence is accomplished in the 
revelation of shared values and, in particular, that the values embodied by the U.S.—that all men 
and women are created equal and that all are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness—are universal.279 As a manifestation of these values, his grand strategy emphasized 
the promotion, but not imposition, of democracy and human rights. 
 Yet, Obama’s grand strategy also embraced American exceptionalism and placed a strong 
emphasis on protecting U.S. interests. According to his grand strategy, domestic rejuvenation 
was the most important U.S. interest. As such, boosting public investment in education, science, 
and clean energy was crucial to long-term success.280 Rhodes summarized Obama’s grand 
strategy approach: winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, reestablishing American 
standing and leadership in the world, and focusing on a broader set of priorities, from Asia and 
the global economy to a nuclear-nonproliferation regime.281 All in all, the Obama Doctrine 
espoused the principle that “the American dream is threatened by many urgent problems, but by 
working hard and working together, it can be reclaimed and strengthened.”282  
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 Obama expressed the underlying principles of his grand strategy in a number of 
significant speeches, including his first and second inaugural addresses. “We will extent a hand if 
you are willing to unclench your fist,” he proclaimed in his first inaugural, and in his second he 
said, “We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully. 
Not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably 
lift suspicion and fear.”283 A number of his major foreign policy speeches abroad, namely in 
Strasbourg, France on April 5, 2009; in Prague, Czech Republic on April 5; in Cairo, Egypt on 
June 4; and in his Nobel Peace Prize speech in Oslo, Norway on December 10, echoed themes of 
engagement and renewed relationships.284 In these speeches, he employed aspirational norm 
setting—declaring his intention to achieve a nuclear free world in Prague and calling for mutual 
understanding between the U.S. and the Arab world in Cairo.285 While his aspirational speeches 
did not necessarily reflect his foreign policy accomplishments, they did embody the sense of 
optimism and renewal that accompanied his first term.  
 Insight into the outcome of Obama’s attempt at grand strategy implementation can be 
found at the individual, domestic and systemic levels of analysis. At the individual level, analysis 
of his operational code is important to understanding his grand strategy as they are closely 
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related. Such an examination shows that according to his initial operational code, hostilities in 
the political universe could be addressed through pragmatic cooperation. Rooted in his 
operational code, he adjusted his grand strategy to be more attuned to global realities, but it still 
encompassed his multilateralist, “reset” agenda. Also at the individual level, the selection and 
management of his foreign policy advisors affected his options for grand strategy 
implementation at the domestic and systemic levels.  
 At the domestic level, Obama faced a number of factors that affected how successful he 
could be at achieving his foreign policy goals. Based on the five-prong test for assessing 
domestic factors, he was confronted with: (1) a foreign policy team that was divided but open to 
communication; (2) a Democratically-controlled Congress for the first two years of his 
presidency and a Republican controlled Congress for the final two years; (3) extended 
presidential power in the aftermath of Bush’s presidency; (4) initially strong, though weakened 
public opinion; and (5) an economy in crisis. These domestic factors are connected to those at 
the individual level in that they impacted Obama’s foreign policy decisions. They are also 
interrelated with those at the systemic level because they affected how well he could respond to 
international events. 
 At the systemic level, Obama faced the inherited legacy of the war in Afghanistan, the 
rise of China, and the uprisings in Egypt and Libya, a series of events that tested the outcome of 
his grand strategy. In response to these systemic events, he shifted his grand strategy to become 
more moderate. These systemic factors are connected to those at the individual level in that they 
caused a shift in his foreign policy decisions. They are also interrelated with those at the 
domestic level in that they brought many domestic level factors to the surface. Based on the two-
prong test for evaluating grand strategy success, he: (1) often succeeded in implementing policies 
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that aligned with his modified grand strategy; and (2) when he implemented policies that aligned 
with his modified grand strategy, they were relatively successful. He had an overall mixed 
package: his worldview, partnered with domestic opportunities and constraints, both facilitated 
and impeded his ability to respond effectively to international events. Thus, Obama achieved 
relative success by both accounts. 
Individual Level of Analysis 
 Obama’s operational code is critical to understanding his grand strategy, as the two are 
closely linked. Stephen G. Walker produced an analysis of Obama’s operational code, based on 
pre-presidential tests, that suggests an unusual pattern.286 He finds that according to Obama’s 
operational code, the political universe is hostile, dominated by chance, and therefore 
unpredictable.287 Further, he is pessimistic regarding the realization of his political values and 
attributes a high role to chance.288 For many people, such a pattern would lead to a passive 
withdrawal rather than instrumental action. Obama, however, retained a sense of being in 
control. Accordingly, his instrumental beliefs and strategies emphasized cooperation based on 
appeals and rewards, rather than threats—though on issues perceived as critical, the appeal for 
cooperation was supplemented by an emphasis on control.289 His instrumental beliefs also 
dictated a high level of acceptance in his orientation toward risk. Additionally, he was show to 
had an average degree of flexibility in his propensity to shift between cooperation and conflict.290 
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Magnus Johnsson, in his analysis of Obama’s operational code, asserts that another foundational 
element in his worldview is the interdependence between individuals and society.291 
Accordingly, his operational code can be characterized as “pragmatic cooperation in a difficult 
world.”292  
 Obama himself cites philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr as a source of inspiration for his 
worldview.293 In a 2007 interview, he claimed that he had taken from Niebuhr the “idea that 
there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain…But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse 
for cynicism and inaction.”294 This is embodied in Obama’s pragmatism and inclusivity, and in 
his willingness to compromise when necessary, while continuing to articulate a vision of 
“working hard and working together,” instead of “drawing lines in the sand.”295 With regard to 
how his operational code changed over the course of his first term, little research has been 
conducted thus far; this makes assessing specific changes in his operational code and hence his 
grand strategy difficult. 
 On top of Obama’s operational code, his advisor selection and management style were 
additional factors at the individual level that affected the outcome of his grand strategy. In 
selecting his foreign policy advisors, he sought to bridge the realist and liberal internationalist 
foreign policy strands within the Democratic Party.296 As secretary of state, he chose Hillary 
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Clinton, his opponent in the 2008 Democratic primary. As secretary of defense, he chose Robert 
Gates, a holdover from the Bush administration, in an effort to ensure continuity in the Pentagon 
during wartime. Obama attempted to create an NSC that would allow the White House to 
maximize control over the policy process.297 He also put a number of interagency committees in 
place to coordinate analysis between federal agencies on complex issues.298 With this in mind, he 
appointed James Jones, a retired Marine Corps General, as NSA.299 After two years, Jones 
stepped down from the position, amid reports that he had struggled to fit in with the Obama 
team.300 Obama named Tom Donilon, Jones’s deputy, as his replacement.301 Another of Obama’s 
key foreign policy advisors, Susan Rice, who formerly served on the staff of the NSC, was 
appointed as U.S. ambassador to the UN.302 Upon taking office, Obama restored her position to 
cabinet-level and repaid the United States’ back payments to the UN, highlighting his globalist 
mentality and his commitment to international institutions, both key elements of his grand 
strategy.  
 Obama’s options for grand strategy implementation at the domestic and systemic levels 
were impacted not only by his selection of foreign policy advisors, but also by the manner in 
which he oversaw them. His management style was highly deliberative and formalistic. With the 
goal of overseeing a “team of rivals,” rather than rival teams, he insisted on analytical rigor in 
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evaluating problems, made sure that dissenting voices were heard, and that a range of options 
were considered.303 His management style emphasized a sense of openness to outcomes and 
process.304 Issues and options, not people, were at the heart of his decision making approach.305 
The downside of this method was that it was rarely compatible with quick decision making, 
which sometimes—as in the review processes for Afghanistan and Libya—led to criticism that 
Obama was indecisive.306 Further, it required him to invest a good deal of his personal time and 
attention coordinating the inner members of his DMU, which on most issues included Clinton, 
Donilon, Vice President Joseph Biden, Senior Advisor David Axelrod, and Chief of Staff Rahm 
Emanuel.307 On the whole, Obama—nicknamed the “professor-in-chief”—oversaw his foreign 
policy advisors in a style that fit with his cerebral, collaborative personal characteristics and the 
inclusive nature of his grand strategy.  
Domestic Level of Analysis 
 Obama also faced factors at the domestic level that affected how successful he could be 
in achieving his foreign policy goals, tensions among his foreign policy advisors being one of 
them. While his management philosophy sought to fill each position in his administration with 
the single most qualified person for the job, it failed to account for the fact that this meant his 
advisors lacked a common approach to dealing with international issues.308 In fact, they weren’t 
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even all Democrats: Gates had served under Bush and Jones had spent his career in the military. 
The vastly different perspectives of Obama’s key advisors contributed to tensions within the 
DMU.  
 Therefore, Obama came to rely heavily upon his own small, informal network of czars 
and close aides—termed “the Obamians” by author and journalist James Mann.309 Although they 
did not hold cabinet-level positions and had minimal foreign policy experience, they were 
installed by Obama primarily on the NSC. They were, for the most part, young idealists who had 
worked with him on the campaign. Of his foreign policy advisors, they shared his views most 
closely.310 Denis McDonough, Obama’s close confidant and the NSC’s second-in-command, and 
Benjamin J. Rhodes, his deputy national security advisor for strategic communication, were 
prime examples of “the Obamians” in that they were relatively young Democrats who reflected 
Obama’s own views.311 Interestingly, although Obama officially employed an inclusive decision 
making process that incorporated dissenting opinions, power was centered in the hands of his 
informal advisors, whose views aligned closely with his grand strategy. The incorporation of 
unofficial actors into the DMU sparked further tensions, as a generational conflict emerged 
between the Democratic establishment—including Gates, Clinton, and Biden—and Obama and 
his inner circle of advisors. By privileging the views of a small network of aides that shared his 
policy perspectives over those of his official advisors, Obama attempted to implement policies 
that aligned with his grand strategy.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
309  Ibid.; David Rothkopf, “It’s Official: Obama Creates More Czars Than the Romanovs,” 
Foreign Policy, April 16, 2009, accessed April 27, 2013, http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com 
/posts/2009/04/16/its_official_obama_creates_more_czars_than_the_romanovs. 
310  Mann, xviii. 
311  Ibid., 66-75. 
! !
! !
!
Birkenthal 77 
 In addition to having to deal with tensions among his foreign policy team, Obama faced a 
number of urgent domestic issues that took priority and delayed the achievement of his broader 
foreign policy goals. Upon taking office, he faced a number of competing demands on the 
domestic front, namely a financial crisis, the most severe recession since the Great Depression, 
and a floundering U.S. healthcare system whose costs were rising rapidly. Clearly, there was 
transformational work to be done at home, and he spent the first two years of his presidency 
doing so.312 The first order of business was an economic stimulus plan: the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act, passed in February 2009, combined anti-recession actions with long-run 
initiatives that laid the foundations for his substantive policy agenda.313 His second order of 
business was financial regulation: the Dodd-Frank Act, passed in July 2010, increased oversight 
of the financial sector.314 His third major domestic initiative was the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act—known as Obamacare—a comprehensive overhaul of the healthcare 
system that was passed in March 2010.315 Because Obama was forced to address these domestic 
issues during his first two years in office, he was confined to focusing only on the most pressing 
international concerns, such as winding down the war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, his grand 
strategy did prioritize domestic rejuvenation as a cornerstone of rebuilding the United States’ 
standing in the world. Thus, after undertaking some much needed improvements at home, he 
turned his attention to a broader set of international concerns. 
 In doing so, he faced another challenge at the domestic level in the form of a hyper-
partisan, recalcitrant Congress. Initially, when both the Senate and the House were controlled by 
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Democrats, there was a period of congressional support for his initiatives.316 Later, when the 
Democrats lost their supermajority in the Senate in January 2010, the legislative body was 
plagued by endless partisan bickering that hampered its ability to address most of his foreign 
policy proposals.317 When the Republicans reclaimed the majority in the House and further 
narrowed the Democrats’ advantage in the Senate following the November midterm elections, 
the policymaking environment became even more toxic.318   
 After the midterm elections, especially, Congress and the Obama administration parted 
ways on many key foreign policy issues.319 Notably, congressional Republicans blocked 
Obama’s attempt to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, an objective that had been central to 
the renewal agenda espoused by his grand strategy.320 From Democrats, he faced opposition to 
the Afghan troop surge; his inclusion of a deadline for the beginning of the U.S. troop 
withdrawal in the announcement of the surge was a concession to congressional Democrats.321 
On U.S. relations with Iran, his dual-track approach—whereby he first attempted to engage in 
diplomatic negotiations and then threatened to impose sanctions—was jeopardized by 
Congress.322 Congress did not follow his lead on Iran; the legislative body passed a sanctions bill 
against the explicit disapproval of the administration.323 As evidenced, Congress affected a 
number of policies that were closely aligned with Obama’s grand strategy, the troop surge, 
Guantanamo, and relations with Iran chief among them.  
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 Obama faced resistance to his policies not only by Congress, but also among the public, 
another check at the domestic level that affected how successful he could be at implementing his 
grand strategy. His election sparked a moment of public euphoria that was short-lived.324 
Although he began his presidency with very strong public opinion, despite having passed 
important legislation to rebuild the economy and reform the healthcare system, his approval 
ratings drifted below fifty percent during his second year in office, lower than the historical 
average for U.S. presidents.325 His low public approval was in part a response to the conditions 
that he inherited, namely the Great Recession and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But on a 
deeper level, the public was responding to the fact that once confronted with economic and 
political realities, Obama struggled to implement policies that aligned with his grand strategy and 
lived up to the standards he had set during the election. He had articulated a clear, coherent grand 
strategy so successfully during the election that it was now impossible for him to live up to the 
rhetoric he had employed to sell it. In this sense, he hindered his own attempt at grand strategy 
implementation. As a result, he was forced to adjust his grand strategy to become more attuned 
to low approval ratings, a domestic economy in crisis, tensions among his foreign policy 
advisors, and a toxic political climate. 
Systemic Level of Analysis 
 As established, Obama’s political style and belief system allowed him to capitalize on an 
initial boost in public opinion and a Democratically-controlled Congress during the first year of 
his presidency. At the same time, he was forced to confront tensions among his foreign policy 
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advisors, urgent domestic concerns, a sharp downturn in public approval, and a stalled Congress. 
These domestic factors forced him to implement a modified version of his grand strategy that 
was rooted in his original principles, but adjusted to better address domestic realities. At the 
systemic level, several significant events tested whether his grand strategy would allow him to 
navigate international challenges: planning an end to the war in Afghanistan (2009), the 
Abbottabad raid that killed Bin Laden (2011), the attempted “reset” of relations with Russia 
(2009), ending the war in Iraq (2011), China’s rise (1980s-present), the Iranian nuclear program 
(1980s-present), and the Arab uprisings (2010-present). Focusing on the war in Afghanistan, 
China’s rise, and the uprisings in Egypt and Libya provide insight into how his grand strategy 
was filtered through factors at the individual and domestic levels of analysis. The goal of this 
analysis is to determine under what conditions a president can implement a grand strategy given 
the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints, and what the implications 
of doing so are for U.S. foreign policy. To address this question, the aforementioned two-prong 
test for measuring success at grand strategy implementation and the five-prong test for assessing 
key domestic factors that affect grand strategy implementation will be employed. 
War in Afghanistan 
 The major foreign project of Obama’s first term was dealing with the inherited legacy of 
the war in Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2009, the situation in the country had deteriorated; 
the Taliban was making a comeback and challenged Hamid Karzai’s central government and 
tribal leaders for control.326 When it became clear in summer 2009 that the U.S. was continuing 
to lose ground in the country, Obama replaced U.S. commander General McKiernan with 
General Stanley McChrystal, who favored a counterinsurgency strategy that would concentrate 
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on protecting the civilian population and building Afghan governing capacity.327 In August, 
McChrystal delivered a troop request—know as the “McChrystal memo”—to Obama with 
options for increasing the U.S. troop presence in the country by 40,000, 30,000, or 10,000.328 In 
the memo, McChrystal argued that more troops would enable the U.S. to prevail in the 
country.329 
 Obama held a series of meetings with his advisors to decide the future of the U.S. 
military commitment.330 On the one hand, Secretaries Gates and Clinton and military leaders 
advocated for an additional 40,000 troops.331 Biden, on the other hand, supported a 
counterterrorism campaign that would focus on defeating al Qaeda rather than on building a 
government in the country. On October 9, Obama made the key decision to change the U.S. 
mission from defeating the Taliban to “degrading it.”332 Then, on November 29, he announced a 
30,000-troop surge—a relatively quick increase in troop strength with a clear time line for 
beginning a drawdown, which would send a message to Karzai that the U.S. commitment was 
not open-ended.333  
 The troop surge serves as a valuable case study because it sheds light on Obama’s 
deliberative decision making process, his formalistic management style, and his attempt at grand 
strategy implementation. In this case, he reached a decision after twenty-five hours of meetings 
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and nine official review sessions spread over three months.334 He was praised by some for his 
careful evaluation of the role of the U.S. military in South Asia.335 But he was also criticized for 
his drawn-out deliberation process.336 During these deliberations, he acted as his own honest 
broker—listening to the arguments made, evaluating them, asking questions, and making a 
decision that he formulated after hearing them.337 In deciding to commit 30,000 troops, he 
explicitly rejected the options presented by his advisors and came to his own decision that was 
inspired directly by his grand strategy.338 Ultimately, it reflected the value he placed both on 
ending the war in Afghanistan, as he had promised on the campaign trail, and on not rushing into 
unnecessary entanglements. His choice was politically difficult, as it risked alienating his support 
on the left of the Democratic Party.339 That he was forced to include a drawdown date in his 
announcement—a concession to congressional Democrats—speaks to the fact that his grand 
strategy was muddled by domestic level constraints such as a partisan Congress. Overall, 
Obama’s plan for ending the war in Afghanistan tested whether his grand strategy was fit to 
respond to international realities. 
Rise of China 
 China’s rise was another systemic level concern that tested whether the Obama Doctrine 
could achieve success. Upon taking office, Obama’s major geostrategic challenge was how to 
react to the dramatic rise of China.340 The country’s dramatic economic growth, averaging 10 
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percent per year, and its integration into the economies of the region through a network of trade 
and investment had given rise to claims that it had become the United States’ “peer 
competitor.”341 Even more worrisome, its military spending had grown at an even faster pace 
than its economy.342  
 It was clear to the Obama administration that containment was not a plausible option for 
dealing with China.343 Neither was a unidimensional approach; U.S. policy could not rely on 
military, economic, or human rights pressure alone. At the same time, indifference to the 
country’s rise could provoke bad behavior and frighten U.S. allies. Thus, Obama was tasked with 
fine-tuning an approach that would avoid these extremes.344 During his first year in office, he 
sought to deepen cooperation between the U.S. and China and to encourage the country to 
assume a greater leadership role and responsibilities.345 Multilaterally, he intensified U.S. 
participation in Asian regional organizations and meetings such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation form (APEC), and the East 
Asia Summit (EAS).346 Bilaterally, he revamped the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue.347 In November 2009, he visited China, making him the first U.S. president to visit the 
country during his first year in office.348 Overall, he viewed these efforts as crucial to offsetting 
the rise of China and reasserting American leadership in an increasingly critical region of the 
world. 
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 However, his policy of inspiring China to become a responsible stakeholder in the 
international order effectively collapsed.349 By early 2010, the Obama administration concluded 
that the financial crisis had convinced China of the United States’ accelerating decline, thus 
causing it to becoming increasingly assertive.350 Accordingly, Obama abandoned his policy of 
strategic engagement and announced a strategic “pivot” from the Middle East to East Asia—
termed the “pivot to Asia.” The pivot involved tightening security, economic, and diplomatic 
relationships with most of China’s neighbors in the region. With the goal of drawing China’s 
neighbors into a web of partnerships, he oversaw an increased U.S. military presence in the 
Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, Vietnam, and other countries in the region.351 
Economically, he implemented the South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the goal of 
strengthening relation with South Korea while simultaneously offsetting the influence of China 
and North Korea.352 Diplomatically, he eased sanctions on Myanmar, both to reward its 
government for undertaking democratic reforms and to establish another alliance in the region.353  
 Seeking to avoid a serious deterioration in U.S.-China relations, China reacted mildly to 
these efforts, and most of the other countries in the region welcomed the pivot with open arms.354 
Thus, Obama’s response to the rise of China, based on the theory of offshore balancing—a 
strategy of burden shifting that aims to maintain U.S. power by withdrawing or downsizing 
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forces in Europe and the Middle East and instead concentrating military power in East Asia— 
achieved relative success.355 His initial attempt at engagement with China, followed by his 
transition to a more aggressive approach, was directly influenced by his operational code and 
grand strategy, which advocated for cooperative engagement, but emphasized control on critical 
issues. As demonstrated by this and other systemic issues, his grand strategy implementation was 
checked by national and international realities. Notably, he was forced to abandon his original 
policy of strategic engagement when the financial crisis hurt U.S. leverage over China. Obama’s 
pivot strategy, based on a modified version of his grand strategy that was adjusted to domestic 
and systemic realities, was rooted in his operational code belief system of forging cooperative 
alliances with a wide range of political actors. 
Arab Uprisings: Egypt and Libya 
 The uprisings in Egypt and Libya were another systemic level event that tested the 
outcome of Obama’s grand strategy. According to Martin Indyk, vice president and director of 
the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution, “Nobody inside the U.S. government 
(nor outside, for that matter) predicted the self-immolation of a fruit seller in Tunisia would 
provide the spark for the revolutionary impulses that would sweep across the Arab world.”356 
Thus, Obama was poorly positioned to deal with a sweeping challenge to the Arab regimes.357  
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 For Obama, the “policy clock” started ticking on January 26, 2011, when the Tahrir 
Square protests began in Egypt.358 On February 1, after concluding that these large-scale protests 
were just and could not be stopped, he had his envoy deliver the message that Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak must give up power. Then, going against advice from his advisors, Obama called 
Mubarak personally to tell him that he must leave office, and then made the same demand in a 
public statement.359 While he realized that Mubarak’s fall would likely lead to increased political 
power for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, he was willing to deal with the 
consequences.360 Thus, he used U.S. leverage over the Egyptian military to assist in bringing 
about a mostly peaceful regime change.361 When the Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi 
won the June 2012 presidential election, Obama recognized his legitimacy.362  
 Obama’s policy toward Libya displayed the same cautious activism that characterized his 
response to the Egyptian revolution. The uprisings in Libya were sparked by President Muammar 
Qaddafi’s four-decade-long effort to consolidate his power and rule by patronage.363 Whereas 
demonstrators in Egypt successfully overthrew Mubarak, Libya collapsed into a drawn-out civil 
war—and soon became a secession—or multiple separate secessions—from a failed state.364 
When Obama decided to use military force in the country, he developed what amounted to the 
Obama Doctrine for the Arab uprisings: “In situations where its interests are not directly 
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threatened, the U.S. will use force only when it has regional and international backing.”365 Even 
then it will not necessarily take the lead role.366  
 Accordingly, on February 28, Obama oversaw the removal of Libya from the UN Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC).367 The debate then turned to whether the U.S. and others should 
intervene militarily; the principal option was to set up a no-fly zone.368 For Obama, whose grand 
strategy sought to disentangle the U.S. from unnecessary conflicts, particularly in the Middle 
East, this was a particularly difficult decision.369 Among his foreign policy advisors, Gates 
objected most strongly to military intervention, while Clinton made the case for a no-fly zone.370 
Obama decided to pursue a more robust UN resolution that would allow the U.S. and NATO 
allies to protect the rebels by bombing government forces.371 On March 17, the UNSC passed his 
resolution, authorizing military action in the country.372 Two days later, a multinational coalition 
began the military intervention—termed a “kinetic military action” by Obama—that succeeded 
in ousting Qaddafi.373 
 On the whole, Obama’s reaction to the uprisings in Egypt and Libya looks reactive and 
improvised, but a flexible approach that protected U.S. interests was critical in the face of rapidly 
evolving events.374 His response was a direct product of his operational code and grand strategy. 
In Egypt, although he initially supported Mubarak, he switched his position to align with the 
democratic will of the Egyptian populace, acting on the underlying principle, voiced in his 
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aspirational speech in Cairo, that democracy is a universal, not a Western value. In Libya, he 
placed an emphasis on gathering a coalition and seeking international authority via multilateral 
organizations, which contrasted directly with the fearless unilateralism of the Bush Doctrine. 
Overall, the Obama Doctrine for the Arab uprisings, like the general Obama Doctrine, prescribed 
cautious multilateralism, a tenet that inspired the principle of “leading from behind.”375 The 
uprisings in Egypt and Libya tested the outcome of his grand strategy at the international level. 
The policies he put in place, which aligned closely with his operational code and grand strategy, 
showed that for an economically-troubled U.S. that was still fighting wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, “leading from behind” was a paradigm with real-world applicability. 
Assessment of Grand Strategy 
 
 In assessing Obama’s attempt at grand strategy implementation, it is clear that although 
he came into office with a grand strategy that called for the “reset” of U.S. foreign policy, he was 
forced to moderate his grand strategy in the face of domestic challenges, namely tensions among 
his foreign policy advisors, hyper-partisanship in Congress, low approval ratings, a domestic 
economy in crisis, and a number of domestic concerns that took priority during his first two 
years as president. Nevertheless, he still succeeded in implementing a grand strategy that was 
directly influenced by his operational code. Characterized by the principles of “reset,” pragmatic 
cooperation, and “leading from behind,” the Obama Doctrine was tested at the international level 
by the plan to end the war in Afghanistan, the rise of China, and the uprisings in Egypt and 
Libya. On the whole, the Obama Doctrine proved effective in responding to these events, though 
Obama’s responses often had to be fine-tuned to global realities. 
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 In a larger sense, Obama’s success at grand strategy implementation proves that grand 
strategies do not deserve the bad reputation that they have earned. Whereas the Carter and Bush 
Doctrines had fairly narrow plans for how to protect a limited set of national interests, the 
Obama Doctrine had a clear strategic vision, but was not dogmatic and did not offer an 
oversimplified view of the world. Its flexibility allowed Obama to implement a grand strategy at 
a time when politically, it was hard a build consensus around anything. It also allowed him to 
address an exceedingly complex portfolio of international concerns that did not necessarily lend 
itself to a narrow doctrine.376 
 In assessing Obama’s presidency according to the earlier established five-prong test for 
evaluating domestic factors, he faced: (1) a foreign policy team with varying views but a shared 
openness to discussion; (2) a Democratically-controlled Congress during years one and two and 
a divided Congress during years three and four of his presidency; (3) a strong presidency as a 
result of following Bush’s presidency; (4) initially strong, though primarily weak public support; 
and (5) a domestic economy in crisis. Overall, this assessment demonstrates that in terms of the 
domestic factors critical to grand strategy implementation, Obama faced a mixed bag, with some 
factors working in his favor and others hindering his success. A weak domestic economy and an 
uncooperative Congress were particularly influential in determining how successful he could be 
at implementing his grand strategy, and they ultimately forced him to moderate his grand 
strategy. As a result of these domestic constraints, his modified grand strategy was less 
interventionist, with a stronger emphasis on renewing American “leadership from behind.” 
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 Based on the two-prong test for determining whether a president has succeeded in grand 
strategy implementation: (1) U.S. foreign policy during Obama’s presidency often aligned with 
his grand strategy; and (2) the policies he put in place that aligned with his grand strategy often 
had positive outcomes. Thus, based on this test, it is clear that although Obama faced a number 
of checks at the domestic level, he adapted his grand strategy and ultimately succeeded in 
implementing it. While the long-term success of his grand strategy is yet to be determined, in the 
short-term, it has improved the global standing of the U.S. Faced with the challenge of following 
in the footsteps of the Bush Doctrine, which had pushed the United States’ global standing to an 
all-time low, he successfully wound down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, shifted the rhetoric 
surrounding the War on Terror, and restored the United States’ standing in the world. His 
relative success can be explained by a set of interconnected factors at the individual, domestic, 
and system levels of analysis that impacted each other and ultimately facilitated his attempt at 
implementing a modified grand strategy. His administration serves as a case study of the 
overlapping conditions that simultaneously obstruct and allow a president to put a grand strategy 
in place: a broad, explicitly clear idea; an impermissive domestic environment rooted in hyper-
partisanship and poor public approval; and a new form of backseat international leadership. 
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Conclusion 
 In applying the question of under what conditions a president can implement a grand 
strategy given the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints, and what 
the implications of doing so are for U.S. foreign policy, to the presidencies of Carter, Bush, and 
Obama, a number of significant conclusions can be drawn. First, examining Carter’s failed 
attempt at grand strategy implementation provides an ideal case study of the conditions that 
make it impossible for a president to put a grand strategy in place. Grand strategy 
implementation requires a strong and effective leader under the domestic conditions outlined in 
the five-prong test (unity of foreign policy team, party alignment between Congress and the 
president, strong presidency, public support, and a healthy domestic economy), with certain 
international conditions in place.  
 Evidence of Carter’s failed attempt at grand strategy implementation can be found at the 
individual, domestic, and systemic levels. At the individual level, his failure can be traced to his 
operational code, leadership, and communication skills. Although his operational code and grand 
strategy shifted significantly in a conflictual direction in response to domestic and international 
realities, neither his original grand strategy nor his later, more aggressive one were clear and 
easily implemented. Both were too focused on human rights promotion and neither was 
sufficient for addressing jarring international crises. Also at the individual level, his attempt at 
grand strategy implementation was hindered by his poor leadership and communication skills, 
which prohibited him from effectively articulating his foreign policy strategy and managing his 
team of advisors. Ultimately, his personal characteristics exacerbated the problems he faced 
domestically. 
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 At the domestic level, the necessary conditions were also not in place. He faced tensions 
among his team of advisors, an uncooperative Congress, an institutionally weak presidency in 
the aftermath of the Vietnam and Watergate scandals, weak public support, and a flaggingly 
economy that muddled his grand strategy. In fact, the only domestic factor that had the potential 
to work in his favor—a Democratically-controlled Congress during all but the final year of his 
presidency—was negated by his poor relations with Democratic congressional leaders. The 
performance of Carter’s grand strategy at the systemic level was not much better. He was faced 
with significant international challenges including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the energy 
crisis, and the Iran hostage crisis. In each of these cases, he reacted with lofty rhetoric and 
aggrandized threats rather than a timely response. This resulted in his failure to push the Soviets 
out of Afghanistan, his inability to bring down oil prices, and his botched attempt to rescue the 
Iran hostages. These defeats destroyed any public support that remained for the Carter Doctrine 
and demonstrated his lack of success in grand strategy implementation. 
 Overall, successful grand strategy requires: (1) a clear, simple, easily implemented idea 
based on the president’s beliefs; (2) a permissive domestic environment rooted in presidential 
popularity, leadership, and partisan support; and (3) international leadership rather than reaction. 
In the case of Carter, he put forth a logically coherent grand strategy, based on an oversimplified 
view of the world and an overemphasis on human rights, which was difficult to implement. He 
was up against a highly impermissive domestic environment rooted in presidential dislike, 
distrust, and unpopularity. He was caught off guard by crises that repeatedly demonstrated the 
failed outcome of his grand strategy at the international level. Unsurprisingly, he is a case study 
of a failed attempt at grand strategy implementation. 
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  The same factors at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of analysis that 
constrained Carter’s attempt at grand strategy implementation facilitated Bush’s. Examining 
Bush’s successful attempt at grand strategy implementation provides an ideal case study of the 
conditions that make it possible for a president to put a grand strategy—though not a good one—
in place. At the individual level, his success can be traced to his operational code and 
management style. He is unique among the case studies presented in that he did not enter office 
with a grand strategy. Prior to the September 11 attacks, he possessed a worldview and a set of 
beliefs about the international system, but his grand strategy itself was a direct product of the 
attacks. His grand strategy was based on the principles of American primacy and preemptive 
war. It was clear, easily implemented, and stemmed directly from global realities, all factors that 
made it relatively easy for him to put in place. Also at the individual level, his attempt at grand 
strategy implementation was facilitated by his closed management style, by which he privileged 
those advisors whose policy preferences aligned closely with his grand strategy over those whose 
preferences did not.  
 The necessary conditions were also in place at the domestic level, where he faced a 
divided foreign policy team, a supportive Congress, a strong presidency in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, strong public support, and a healthy domestic economy, factors that 
facilitated his attempt at grand strategy implementation. In fact, the only domestic factor that had 
the potential to work against him—the divide among his foreign policy advisors—was mitigated 
by his management style. Bush’s performance at the systemic level was equally strong. Whereas 
Carter was confronted with significant systemic challenges that demanded timely, decisive 
responses, with the exception of the September 11 attacks, Bush’s presidency was defined by 
action, not reaction. In the aftermath of the attacks, he passed sweeping counterterrorism 
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legislation and led the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, all part of his global War on 
Terror, influenced directly by his operational code and grand strategy. Bush put forth a logically 
coherent grand strategy, based on an oversimplified view of the world and the United States’ role 
in it, that was easy to implement. He benefitted from a highly permissive domestic environment 
rooted in the September 11 rally effect and a healthy domestic economy. Excluding the 
September 11 attacks, he initiated bold systemic action, even without international authorization. 
He is a case study of a president who succeeded in grand strategy implementation as a result of 
the usual domestic checks having fallen out of place.  
 However, just because Bush was capable of implementing a grand strategy does not mean 
that it was necessarily good for the United States’ standing in the world. This is partly because 
the domestic factors that allow for or constrain implementation often have little to do with U.S. 
national interests and a lot to do with domestic power alignments. Thus, the question of whether 
a president has successfully implemented a grand strategy is distinct from whether he has 
implemented a successful grand strategy. In the case of the Bush Doctrine, its successful 
implementation had a lot to do with a permissive national and international environment, but in 
the long-run, its policies were not successful. In particular, the long wars that he initiated in 
Afghanistan and Iraq damaged the global standing of the U.S. and were highly costly, 
economically as well as in human lives. 
 Obama, as the third case study, provides an example of a president who faced a mixed 
array of opportunities and constraints, rather than primarily hurtful or helpful factors, as in the 
cases of Carter and Bush, respectively. Evidence of Obama’s attempt at grand strategy 
implementation can be found at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels. At the individual 
level, his success at putting a moderated version of his grand strategy in place can be traced to 
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his operational code, leadership, and communication skills. His original grand strategy, directly 
inspired by his operational code, was very clearly articulated, but not easily implemented in light 
of domestic and international realities. Thus, he put a modified grand strategy in place that was 
more attuned to real-world challenges. Both were based on the underlying principles of renewed 
relationships, cooperative engagement, and “leading from behind.” Also at the individual level, 
his attempt at grand strategy implementation was facilitated by his aspirational communication 
and management styles, which allowed him to effectively articulate his grand strategy vision and 
oversee his team of advisors.  
 At the domestic level, Obama encountered mixed conditions. He faced tensions among 
his foreign policy advisors, a stalled Congress, a relatively strong presidency, rapidly 
deteriorating public support, and a struggling economy. This unique combination of factors 
simultaneously assisted and hindered his attempt at grand strategy implementation, with 
Congress and the economy posing the most serious threat to his attempt. The performance of his 
grand strategy at the systemic level was generally successful, though more so after he modified 
his grand strategy. He was faced with significant international challenges including the inherited 
legacy of the war in Afghanistan, China’s rise, and uprisings in Egypt and Libya. In each of these 
cases, he employed his inclusive, deliberative decision making process and formalistic 
management style to address the challenges at hand with the help of allies and by means of 
international institutions. Another common thread that runs through these events is that Obama 
was not afraid to make unconventional, unexpected decisions that went against the 
recommendations of his foreign policy advisors but aligned closely with his grand strategy. As a 
result, he undertook a 30,000-troop-surge in Afghanistan with the eventual goal of winding down 
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the war, implemented the “pivot to Asia” with the objective of offsetting China’s rise, and 
oversaw “leadership from behind” in the U.S. response in uprisings in Egypt and Libya.  
 These examples prove that the Obama Doctrine in its moderated form was equipped to 
respond to international challenges. Obama put forth a grand strategy that was logically coherent, 
though initially difficult to implement. The Obama Doctrine consisted of a clearly articulated, 
yet broad set of national interests, and it was not based on an oversimplified view of the world. 
In putting it in place, he was up against a mixed domestic environment rooted in hyper-
partisanship and economic woes. His responses to international challenges were innovate and 
based on his operational code and grand strategy. His is a case study of an attempt at grand 
strategy implementation that was neither an overwhelming failure nor an overwhelming success. 
 Taken in its entirety, this analysis demonstrates that if a president is a strong and effective 
leader with a clear strategy in mind, conditions domestically are such that he can work 
effectively within them, and his grand strategy aligns with global realities, then he can put a 
grand strategy in place. Interestingly, these findings point to the fact that “grand strategies are 
not nearly as important as grand strategists like to think.”377 There is a reason that history has 
endowed grand strategies with a generally bad reputation: they often place value on an overly 
narrow set of national interests and shortsighted operational plans for achieving them. It is no 
coincidence that U.S. history’s most memorable grand strategies—the Truman Doctrine, and the 
Carter and Bush Doctrines, of course—all fell into the trap of subscribing to an oversimplified 
view of the political universe. In this regard, the Obama Doctrine—despite the administration’s 
hesitation to label it as such—is unique. It is simultaneously broad, flexible, and palatable to a 
broad range of actors and rigid in its commitment to multilateralism, engagement, restraint, and 
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renewal. It prescribes a set of national interests, but it is not dogmatic and does not rely on 
oversimplifications. As a result of these seemingly inconsistent elements, Obama has been 
labeled by many as an “ad hoc” decision maker with regards to foreign policy.  
 However, the fact is that:  
Geopolitics today is too complex, messy, and various to be bent to 
America’s will by an overarching doctrine like containment, or a 
massive initiative like the Marshall Plan, or a single breakthrough 
like Nixon’s trip to China. A doctrine is what put the country in a 
deep hole; climbing out [will require] restraint, flexibility, and 
opportunism.378 
 
Obama’s presidency has been marked by both massive global disruption—in the form of the 
Great Recession and the Arab uprisings—and a power transition—in the form of the United 
States’ confrontation with China, a rising challenger.379 His management style, rooted in his 
deliberative operational code and grand strategy, whereby he opens as many advising channels as 
possible, has thus far allowed him to navigate these challenges as they arise. This contrasts 
directly with Bush, who was a “gut player” rather than an analytical decision maker, and created 
a “bubble” to protect him from any advice that did not conform to his pre-existing views.380 Their 
respective styles are reflected in the nature of their grand strategies: Bush’s was rigid, dogmatic, 
and overly narrow in scope, whereas Obama’s is a set of principles that guide his decision 
making process. The latter is almost certainly more likely to achieve success in the long run. 
 Looking forward, it is worth considering Obama’s second term (2012-2016) in light of 
this analysis. Assuming that there have been no major shifts in his operational code, his grand 
strategy will likely be similar to the one that he implemented during his first term. However, as 
time goes on, the Obama Doctrine may be trending in a more cautious direction. This is 
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evidenced by his selection of Senator John Kerry as secretary of state and Senator Chuck Hagel 
as secretary of defense, both of whom are decidedly less interventionist that Clinton and Rice 
were in his first administration. This raises questions about how Obama’s second term foreign 
policy will differ, if at all, from that of his first term. Will it align more or less closely with his 
grand strategy? How will his grand strategy fare under the weight of sequestration and an even 
more toxic partisan environment? How will it respond to events at the international level, such as 
the Syrian revolution, the Eurozone crisis, and the ongoing drone campaign in Pakistan? If his 
first term is any indication, the Obama Doctrine will overcome domestic constraints to rise to 
these complex challenges, adapting itself in the process. 
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